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Abstract 
Advances in the information and communication technology have created the 
field of "health informatics," which amalgamates healthcare, information 
technology and business. The use of information systems in healthcare 
organisations dates back to 1960s, however the use of technology for healthcare 
records, referred to as Electronic Medical Records (EMR), management has 
surged since 1990’s (Net-Health, 2017) due to advancements the internet and 
web technologies. Electronic Medical Records (EMR) and sometimes referred to 
as Personal Health Record (PHR) contains the patient’s medical history, allergy 
information, immunisation status, medication, radiology images and other 
medically related billing information that is relevant. 
 
There are a number of benefits for healthcare industry when sharing these data 
recorded in EMR and PHR systems between medical institutions (AbuKhousa et 
al., 2012). These benefits include convenience for patients and clinicians, cost-
effective healthcare solutions, high quality of care, resolving the resource 
shortage and collecting a large volume of data for research and educational 
needs. 
 
My Health Record (MyHR) is a major project funded by the Australian 
government, which aims to have all data relating to health of the Australian 
population stored in digital format, allowing clinicians to have access to patient 
data at the point of care. Prior to 2015, MyHR was known as Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR). Though the Australian 
government took consistent initiatives there is a significant delay (Pearce and 
Haikerwal, 2010) in implementing eHealth projects and related services. While 
this delay is caused by many factors, interoperability is identified as the main 
problem (Benson and Grieve, 2016c) which is resisting this project delivery. 
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To discover the current interoperability challenges in the Australian healthcare 
industry, this comparative study is conducted on Health Level 7 (HL7) messaging 
models such as HL7 V2, V3 and FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability 
Resources). In this study, interoperability, security and privacy are main elements 
compared. In addition, a case study conducted in the NSW Hospitals to 
understand the popularity in usage of health messaging standards was utilised to 
understand the extent of use of messaging standards in healthcare sector.   
 
Predominantly, the project used the comparative study method on different HL7 
(Health Level Seven) messages and derived the right messaging standard which 
is suitable to cover the interoperability, security and privacy requirements of 
electronic health record. The issues related to practical implementations, change 
over and training requirements for healthcare professionals are also discussed. 
 
The study finds that HL7’s FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability Standards) is 
the most suitable messaging standard satisfying all the modern demands for 
healthcare interoperability requirements.  These interoperability requirements are 
communication methods, security, usage of encryption, privacy, compatibility, 
flexibility and reliability. FHIR has satisfied all these requirements well and it is 
the most preferred one among other HL7 standards. The adoption rate of FHIR is 
expected to be high as it has the flexible transport and client-side features. 
However, FHIR is still in draft status and it may take considerable time to plan for 
resource repository and training to healthcare professionals. Further, the study 
recommends a solution for the suitable health messaging standard, for the 
technology professionals, implementing healthcare systems that can effectively 
communicate with other systems such as MyHR. 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
The demand for Electronic Health Records (EHR) is increasing globally because 
of how it benefits healthcare systems due to the lower costs and easier usage. 
Many developed countries are now investing in EHR systems. To improve the 
efficiency of their healthcare facilities, they help to encourage the use of digital 
health records, even though there are security and privacy challenges to be 
resolved. Australian National level electronic health record system, previously 
known as Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) and now 
known as My Health Record (MyHR), is the major project funded by the 
Australian government.  MyHR aims to have all the Australian population’s 
health-related data stored in a digital format (Health, 2017). This allows clinicians 
to have access to the required patient’s health data at the point of care. Sharing 
this data electronically between institutions brings numerous advantages 
(AbuKhousa et al., 2012). Although the Australian government took constant 
initiatives and funded at the state and federal levels, there is a major delay in 
implementing eHealth projects and related services (Pearce and Haikerwal, 
2010). This delay was caused by many factors. However, lack of interoperability 
between the healthcare information systems was identified as the main problem 
which is resisting this project delivery (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). In addition, 
health data security and privacy are other critical problem to be resolved together 
with interoperability (Ray and Wimalasiri, 2006).  
 
In the context of information technology, interoperability refers to connecting 
more than one system and exchange their data efficiently. Every health 
organisation maintains their patients’ health records either with the internationally 
approved standard or with the organisation approved local standard. These data 
and health message standards help their system to exchange the data and make 
it interoperable by avoiding duplicates and delays (Benson and Grieve, 2016). 
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The interoperable healthcare information systems can achieve the good quality 
and low cost healthcare services. The health messaging standards are helpful to 
overcome the lack of interoperability between the healthcare information systems 
(Benson and Grieve, 2016c). This project discusses the health data standards 
such as ICD (International Classification of Diseases), LOINC (Logical 
Observation Identifiers Names and Codes), SNOMED CT (Systematised 
Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terminology), healthcare messaging 
standards such as HL7(Health Level Seven) versions 1, 2, 3 and FHIR (Fast 
Healthcare Interoperability Standards). The project compares the different 
messaging standards utilised in between healthcare information systems, such 
as between a hospital system and a national level health record like MyHR. The 
analysis on different health messaging standards has used criteria on 
interoperability methods, security, usage of encryption, privacy, compatibility, 
flexibility, reliability and other miscellaneous features such as technology, 
transport mechanism, granularity features, popularity, adoption rate, and 
implementation cost. 
 
As part of the research study, there was a case study conducted in eHealth, New 
South Wales (NSW) State to measure the usage of health messaging system in 
the NSW hospitals. The case study has revealed the challenges faced by the 
healthcare organisations on interoperability and created a strong interest to 
conduct further research in the health messaging interoperability and associated 
features such as security and privacy.  
 
One of the most important aspects of healthcare is interoperability, However, it is 
one of the more misunderstood aspects (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). This is 
partly due to the skills required to manage the interoperability in healthcare. Most 
of the earlier research completed in healthcare interoperability either cover the 
medical field (Leroux et al., 2017, Pais et al., 2017, Boussadi and Zapletal, 2017)  
or the information field (Smits et al., 2015, Ruiz, 2016, Lubamba and Bagula, 
2017, Guinan, 2013). There are very few research projects (Legner and 
Lebreton, 2007) completed has covered both the fields. The coverage of 
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interoperability with the usage of modern technologies together with Australian 
standard is very few to none. This project covers both medical and information 
communication fields with Australian specific standards. Moreover, this work is 
comparing the modern features of FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability 
Standards) and its practical usage in Australian hospitals and MyHR systems, 
which is not addressed in previous research. 
 
The thesis is structured to cover the literature review in chapter 2 which covers 
the healthcare data and messaging standards with the relevant background 
details. Also, the literature review covers the interoperability, security and privacy 
in the subsections. Research objectives and methodology are covered in 
chapters 3 and 4, followed by a detailed study of healthcare messaging 
standards in chapter 5 and healthcare data standards usage within messaging 
systems in chapter 6. Chapter 7 covers the case study completed in eHealth, 
NSW department which explains the healthcare interoperability and its 
associated benefits in NSW hospital environment. Chapter 8 covers all the 
comparative study findings on HL7 V2, V3 and FHIR messaging standards using 
the features such as interoperability methods, security, usage of encryption, 
privacy, compatibility, flexibility, reliability, granularity features and other 
miscellaneous features. Chapter 9 and 10 discuss and conclude the findings of 
this thesis based on the analysis derived from the comparison study and case 
study which are covered in the earlier chapters. 
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(2) Literature Review 
 
2.1. Standards in Healthcare 
As per the definition of ISO (International Standardisation Organisation), standard 
as a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognised body, 
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context (Benson and 
Grieve, 2016a). The evolution of health data standards was started from the year 
1901 (Braunstein, 2015b). Early data standards were lists such as medical 
diagnoses, laboratory tests or medications. Those are generally referred as list 
standards or classifications. Later, attention has been paid to coding more details 
about each identity and relationships among the entities. Using these standards, 
more details including relationships as ontologies can be established. 
International Classification of Disease (ICD) is the first known health standards, 
introduced by World Health Organisation (WHO) in the year 1901 (Moriyama et 
al., 2011). It was followed by Current Procedural Terminology (CPT), introduced 
by American Medical Association in the year 1966 (Moriyama et al., 2011). Later 
in the year 1970 Systematised Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terms 
(SNOMED) was introduced (Lundberg et al., 2008). Then in the year 1993, Arden 
syntax (Hripcsak et al., 1990) was introduced. In the year 1994, Logical 
Observation Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC) were introduced (Forrey et 
al., 1996) by Regenstrief Institute, a US non-profit medical research organisation. 
In the year 1997, Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) profiles were 
introduced by a non-profit organisation with the same name Integrating the 
Healthcare Enterprise (Siegel and Channin, 2001).In this literature review, the 
healthcare standards section discusses the key health data standards such as 
ICD, LOINC, SNOMED CT, DICOM and OpenEHR. Integrating the Healthcare 
Enterprise (IHE) is a technical framework and is not a data standard (Henderson 
et al., 2001). IHE can be used together with other health messaging standards 
such as HL7 (Health Level Seven) to improve the interoperability in healthcare 
domain. IHE is covered under the healthcare messaging standards section of the 
literature review in detail. 
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2.1.1. International Classification of Diseases, ICD 
ICD (International Classification of Diseases) helps to monitor and report data 
referring to diseases and deaths throughout the world by providing a common 
language so that the data can be shared between hospitals, countries and 
regions in a consistent way (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). ICD is used for 
morbidity cording within medical records and mortality coding with death 
certificates (World-Health-Organisation, 2017b). The World Health Organisation 
published ICD-9 in 1977, and a clinical modification of it (ICD-9-CM) was used in 
the USA for payment purposes up until 2015 (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). ICD-9 
was used in Australia up until 1998 (The-Medical-Journal-of-Australia, 2017). 
ICD-10 was published in 1992. Now, over 117 countries use ICD-10, which was 
published in 1992, to report data relating to mortality (Makary and Daniel, 2016). 
The coding scheme used in ICD-10 is alphanumeric at the four-character level, 
made up of one letter followed by three numbers. The extended clinical 
modification of the 10th version is referred as ICD-10-CM. The extended 
Australian version of ICD-10 is referred to as the ICD-10-AM (Australian 
Modification) (Sundararajan et al., 2004). ICD-10-AM uses an alphanumeric 
coding scheme for diseases and external causes of injury. It is structured by body 
system and aetiology, and comprises three, four and five character categories 
(Quan et al., 2005). 
 
Here is the sample code and meaning for ICD-10, ICD-10-CM and ICD-10-AM 
that shows how specificity of various diseases explanations varies from base 
version to country specific modifications. 
Table 2.1.1-1 ICD 10 code and meaning (ICD-10-Data, 2017) 
  
Table 2.1.1-2 ICD 10 CM code and meaning (ICD-10-Data, 2017) 
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Table 2.1.1-3 ICD 10 – AM code and meaning (Cumerlato, 2017) (Huang et al., 
2008) 
 
  
When looking at the above examples, it is evident that use of a clinical 
classification system coded data allows comparison of data from different 
countries. This is especially valuable when clinical data is recorded in various 
languages, which gives the ability to compare the coded data irrespective of the 
language in which the medical record was kept in. 
 
Since 1988, the Australian Classification of Health Interventions (ACHI) has also 
been in use. Previously known as the Medicare Benefits Schedule-Extended, 
ACHI was based on the Medicare Benefits Schedule (Doyle and Dimitropoulos, 
2009). ACHI was developed by the National Centre for Classification in Health 
(NCCH), and the development was assisted by clinical coders and specialist 
clinicians (ACCD, 2017). ACHI codes have seven digits. The first five digits are 
MBS item number, and the two-digit extension represents specific interventions 
that are included in the item. The classification is structured by site, body system 
and intervention type. Interventions currently not listed are also included in MBS, 
such as dental, cosmetic surgery and allied health interventions (ACCD, 2017).  
ACHI consists of an alphabetic index with a tabular list of interventions. 
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ACHI Code and Description 
 
 
Currently, there is no international level WHO approved classification system for 
medication interventions and procedures. 
 
WHO (World Health Organisation) is currently revising the current ICD version 10 
towards the new version ICD-11(World-Health-Organisation, 2017c). ICD-11 
have definitions for each disease entity that provide guidance and key 
descriptions for the meaning and human readable format (Endicott, 2013). The 
current ICD 10 version has only the title headings. The release of ICD-11 was 
planned for the year 2017 but has been shifted the release to the year 2018 
(World-Health-Organisation, 2017a).  In addition to ICD-11, WHO also wishes to 
release an international level healthcare interventions (World-Health-
Organisation, 2017d) called ICHI (International Classifications of Health 
Interventions) in 2018. 
 
2.1.2. Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes, LOINC 
The data for research, clinical care, quality improvement and reporting and public 
health reporting need to be merged by clinical and laboratory systems. Most 
systems use their own codes to help identify the results coming from electronic 
messages that transmit results, which usually come from other systems. 
Receiving systems cannot understand the contents of these without having to 
map every item to their own codes as a result of this, so there was a need for 
identifiers for laboratory and clinical observations. There was a demand for the 
identifiers for clinical and laboratory observations. To fix this issue, LOINC 
(Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes) provides a set of universal 
identifiers (Lin et al., 2011). LOINC is community-built and is a universal code 
system that assists with laboratory and clinical systems, and how they would 
exchange and process between systems (Benson and Grieve, 2016a). This 
technology is controlled and it is built using a formal structure which contains fully 
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specified names and unique identifiers. In 1994, the Regenstrief Institute made a 
way that the database would be developed, which is due to the setup of the 
LOINC Committee (Forrey et al., 1996). Later LOINC Committee and the 
Regenstrief Institute have published more than 50 versions of the standard. 
LOINC has been adopted in both the public and private sector by government 
agencies, laboratories, care delivery organisations, health information exchange 
efforts, healthcare payers and research organisations standards (Benson and 
Grieve, 2016a). LOINC is available in 21 languages and dialects and it is used in 
170 countries by over 40,000 people.(Regenstrief-Institute, 2017a) and LOINC 
team have enabled multilingual searching capacities in their searching tools, 
RELMA (Regenstrief LOINC Mapping Assistant) and search.loinc.org 
(Regenstrief-Institute, 2017b).  
 
 Table 2.1.2.1 LOINC Code and related clinical observation details 
 
 
LOINC is available for free (Regenstrief-Institute, 2017c) and is distributed from 
the LOINC website, where an updated version is released twice in a year. The 
main LOINC database is published in several different file formats. A software 
program that helps users to browse the database and map local terminology to 
LOINC terms is also distributed by Regenstrief Institute. It is called the 
Regenstrief LOINC Mapping Assistant  (Regenstrief-Institute, 2017d), or RELMA. 
LOINC also provides alternate names along with the fully specified names, which 
are used in other situations, and it also contains codes for the atomic elements 
that make up these alternate names. To organise LOINC terms, link descriptions 
and link synonyms, constructed hierarchies by LOINC parts are utilised. They are 
also the basis for efficiently translating LOINC names.  LOINC also holds a robust 
coverage which represents a listed collection of observations (Forrey et al., 1996) 
LOINC 
Code 
System Short Name Long Name Type 
29463-7 Patient Weight Body weight Clinical 
11450-4 Patient Problem List 
- Reported 
Problem List - 
Reported 
Clinical 
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that capture attributes of individual data, elements, hierarchical structure of the 
elements, value sets and panel-specific features of data elements. 
 
 
 
2.1.3. Systematised Nomenclature of Medicine - Clinical Terms, SNOMED 
CT 
SNOMED is similar to ICD and LOINC in principle. However, it is much more 
meaningful to humans i.e. healthcare professionals, as opposed ICD and LOINC 
more suitable to be used in healthcare systems. Since it is based on an ontology 
(Harispe et al., 2014), the hierarchy data can also be kept. The difference 
between the LOINC and similar other classification based standards and 
SNOMED is those are categories and list (Bodenreider, 2008). However, 
SNOMED CT can show a relationship among the categories and subtypes (Beale 
and Heard, 2007).  SNOMED CT has had two direct successors, one of which is 
the Read Code (Benson, 2011). Read codes are used in primary care. Since 
1990, all general practitioners from the UK and New Zealand have been using 
the Read Code. There is 4-byte, Version 2 and Version 3 are some versions of 
the Read Codes that have been released. New Zealand still uses the original 4-
byte Read Code today. The College of American Pathologists founded a 
committee in late 1955 to develop a nomenclature for anatomic pathology 
(Benson, 2010a).  Later in 1965, they published the Systemised Nomenclature of 
Pathology, which talks about the findings of pathology using four axes: 
Topography (anatomic site affected), Etiology (the causes for diseases), 
Morphology (structural changes associated with diseases) and Function 
(physiologic alterations associated with disease) (Benson, 2011). SNOMED CT is 
the successor of the Systemised Nomenclature of Pathology (SNOP) (Cornet and 
de Keizer, 2008). In 1975, SNOP had been extended by adding additional data 
and dimensions regarding diseases and procedures by Roger Cote and his 
colleagues (Benson, 2011). 
 
 
SNOMED CT is the most comprehensive multilingual clinical healthcare 
terminology available. It helps to facilitate clinical documentation and reporting 
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and to retrieve and analyse clinical data. SNOMED CT contains two key features, 
the first being that is it virtually future-proof  (Romero et al., 2011), as it evolves 
constantly and inherently. Terms and concepts and their codes can be freely 
added or removed, and their relationship with other terms and concepts can also 
be freely updated. These all make SNOMED CT a major improvement over other 
coding systems that are used in healthcare. It is also flexible as it supports many 
different languages. In addition, SNOMED CT also supports the change of 
relationships between data, including many parent-child relationships. This 
reflects the nature of reality and the code’s practicality (Stearns et al., 2001). The 
number of descriptions, concepts and relationships differ with every version 
release. It contains around one million English descriptions, 300,000 active 
concepts and more than 1.4 million relationships (Benson and Grieve, 2016d). It 
can only be accessed via special software, which includes SNOMED CT 
browsers, so this cannot be used with a paper version. SNOMED CT does very 
little on its own, however, when it is built into software such as electronic health 
records (EHR), (Giannangelo and Fenton, 2008), its value is realised. SNOMED 
CT gives us an extensive foundation when expressing clinical data in 
interoperability and data warehouses and local systems. It is organised into a 
hierarchy (Benson and Grieve, 2016d). In a hierarchy, a node represents each 
concept, including one or more subtype relationships to its parent. Components 
such as relationships, concepts, descriptions, cross maps and reference sets are 
what make up the SNOMED CT (Lee et al., 2013). A SNOMED CT Identifier’s 
role is to identify every component. All components carry an active field. 
Permanence is an important principle of the SNOMED CT. Once a component, 
such as a relationship or a description is created, it can never be deleted; 
however the active flag’s status may be set to inactive. They each also have a 
module ID, which helps identify the origin and the organisation that is responsible 
for maintaining this component. (Benson and Grieve, 2016d). 
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Table 2.1.3.1 Description detail for a concept - myocardial infarction (disorder) 
(Australian-eHealth-Research-Centre, 2017) 
 
 
Search on Concept Id Hierarchical structure for the concept Id:22298006 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.1.3.1 The hierarchical structure for myocardial infarction (disorder) 
(Australian-eHealth-Research-Centre, 2017) 
 
The concepts and their hierarchies in SNOMED fall into three different 
categories: object hierarchies, value hierarchies and miscellaneous hierarchies 
(Benson, 2010b). The three main ways of entering coded data into SNOMED 
include using options, text parser matching and single concept matching. Options 
are used when rather than entering in text; the user selects the data from a bunch 
Concept Id Description Description type Acceptability 
22298006 
Myocardial 
infarction 
(disorder) 
Fully Specified 
Name (FSN) 
Preferred 
Myocardial 
infarction 
Synonym 
Infarction of 
heart 
Acceptable 
Cardiac 
infarction 
Heart attack 
Myocardial 
infarct 
MI Myocardial 
infarction 
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of options. In text parser matching, the user enters notes as unconstrained free 
text and the SNOMED server takes it and matches words and phrases from its 
database. In single concept matching, a note is entered by the user and they 
select an appropriate match made by the server and elaborated as required. This 
requires the system to correctly match and identify SNOMED concepts as well as 
construct post coordinated expressions that are based on sanctioned attribute 
relationships from the text (Benson, 2010b). 
 
 
2.1.4. Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine, DICOM 
 
DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard was 
conceived in 1983 by a joint committee formed by the American College of 
Radiology (ACR), and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association(NEMA) 
(Pianykh, 2009). The DICOM standard is free and can be found on the official 
DICOM website, http://medical.nema.org, maintained by the National Electrical 
Manufacturers Association (NEMA). However, for enterprise and professional 
use, DICOM can usually be implemented in devices and software. DICOM use 
the compression techniques of all well-known image compression algorithms 
such as RLE (Run Length Encoding), JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group), 
JPEG2000, JPEG –LS (JPEG Lossless), and ZIP (Pianykh, 2009). It is primarily 
implemented in medical equipment that is used by all of the main manufacturers. 
DICOM is the universal format for PACS (picture archiving and communication 
systems) image storage and transfer. All of the main PACS manufacturers use 
DICOM, although each unit only implements a subset of DICOM (Le et al., 2009). 
 
DICOM role in the health messaging standard, particularly in the interoperability 
is crucial. DICOM covers the data transfer, storage and display protocol built and 
designed to handle all functional aspects of contemporary medicine. DICOM 
comprise of three aspects. They are modalities, digital image archives and 
Workstations (Bidgood Jr et al., 1997). Modalities are digital image acquisition 
devices, such as CT scanners or ultrasound. Digital image archives are the 
storage where the acquired images are placed. The Workstations are where 
radiologists view the images (Pianykh, 2009). DICOM defines the formats for 
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medical images that can be exchanged with the data and quality necessary for 
clinical use. DICOM is used for most imaging modalities including radiography, 
ultrasound, nuclear medicine, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), tomography, 
echocardiography, X-ray, CT, ultrasound and other modalities used in cardiology, 
radiology, ophthalmology, radiotherapy and dentistry (Benson, 2010b). DICOM 
system uses .dcm for its file extension and it consists of a header, followed by 
pixel data. The header consists of the patient name, other patient particulars and 
graphical details. The graphical details include width, height and image bits per 
pixel (CODE-Project, 2017). 
 
The screen capture of sample anonymised image and its DICOM code are 
printed in figure 2.1.4.1 and 2.1.4.2. The image and its converted DICOM code 
can be accessed using DICOM viewer tool from www.dicomlibrary.com website. 
The DICOM file has all these associated details in the form of tags and values 
(DICOM-NEMA, 2017). The DICOM file cannot be opened using tools such as 
notepad, word and other related text editing tools. It can be viewed using the 
appropriate DICOM viewer tools (CODE-Project, 2017). 
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Figure 2.1.4.1. DICOM anonymised image (DICOM-library, 2017) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.4.2. DICOM Code for the anonymised image (DICOM-library, 2017) 
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2.1.5. OpenEHR 
OpenEHR is an open standard specification in health messaging standard 
systems that manage the retrieval and exchange of health data in electronic 
health records (EHR) system. In openEHR, all health data for a person is stored 
permanently, vendor-independent, and patient-centred EHR (Benson and Grieve, 
2016c). The openEHR specifications are maintained by the openEHR 
Foundation, a not for profit foundation supporting the open research, 
development, and implementation of openEHR. OpenEHR covers demographics, 
clinical workflow and archetypes. An archetype is a computable expression of a 
domain content model in the form of structured constraint statements, based on 
some reference model (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). Two-level modelling is the 
key concept used in the openEHR systems. This approach separates the 
semantics of information and knowledge into two levels. Reference Model is 
placed at first level and this concept improves maintenance over single-level 
systems. Formal definitions of clinical content in form of archetypes and 
templates are placed at the second level, and it is called as knowledge level. So, 
the clinical content can be developed and sustained directly by domain 
specialists and not by IT personnel (Pahl et al., 2015).  
 
There are useful templates which support the openEHR model, which is available 
for access freely (openEHR-Atlassian, 2017). A sample openEHR template which 
supports medication ordering and prescribing process is displayed below (DCM-
NEHTA, 2017). Using this template, context-specific clinical data sets and 
documents can be created and used in the EHR systems(openEHR-Atlassian, 
2017).  
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Figure 2.1.6.1 PRESCRIPTION Template which supports openEHR model 
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2.2 Standards in Healthcare Messaging  
There are many international organisations supporting health message standards 
and those details were covered in section 2.1. Here, the two important messaging 
standards, HL7 and FHIR are discussed in detail. 
 
 
2.2.1. Health Level Seven, HL7  
Health Level Seven (HL7) standards are one of the standards that support clinical 
practice, administration, delivery, and evaluation of health services (Dolin et al., 
2001). HL7 standards are formed by HL7 International, an international standards 
organisation which is similar to the ANSI (American National Standards Institute) 
and ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation).  The HL7 organisation 
has affiliates in 31 countries. HL7 produces the world’s most widely used 
standards for healthcare interoperability. HL7 does not develop software, but 
simply provides healthcare organisations with specifications for making their 
systems interoperable (Benson and Grieve, 2016c). HL7 collaborates and 
provides a meeting place for healthcare information experts from the healthcare 
IT industry and healthcare providers to work together and with other standards 
development organisations. HL7 standards refer the application layer, which is 
layer 7 in the OSI, Open Systems Interconnection model. The OSI model is made 
up of 7 layers. The first three relate to applications and the other four layers relate 
to the transmission of data. The application level interface performs common 
application services for the application processes (Health-Level-Seven-
International, 2017b). In the year 1987, HL7 version 2 was introduced. The earlier 
versions of HL7 are a simple prototype and no real implementations were done 
with those versions. Most of the major health organisations use HL7 health 
messaging standard. In the year 2000, HL7 based CDA (Clinical document 
architecture) and CCD (Continuity of Care Document) were introduced.  In the 
year 2004, XML based HL7 version 3 was introduced (Guo et al., 2004). The 
technical details of each HL7 version are covered in details under the section 5, 
Healthcare messaging standards of this document. 
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2.2.2. Fast Healthcare Interoperability Standards, FHIR 
FHIR, also from HL7 International, was mainly created after facing 
implementation issues with the earlier HL7 standards version 2.xx and 3.xx. HL7 
FHIR is built based on RESTful interfaces (Khalilia et al., 2015). Additional 
resources, extensions, and a human readable XHTML display may be referenced 
in the resources of FHIR (Smits et al., 2015). FHIR has a formal maturity process 
(Imler et al., 2016) that is linked to an implementation outcome, also has an open 
licence and fully focused on implementation.  
 
 
2.3 Interoperability technologies in Healthcare  
The intention to have interoperability in the electronic medical records (EMR) 
applications is to take safer decisions and also to avoid duplicates and delays in 
the health message exchange (Benson and Grieve, 2016d). The majority of the 
investments in EMR and eHealth related services were failed due to poor 
interoperability (Keshavjee et al., 2009). Interoperability is the critical 
communication element connecting components of different healthcare 
departments within and outside the systems(Kumar and Aldrich, 2010). For an 
example, clinical care is made up of many numbers of discrete tasks, each with 
its own information and communication needs. Their terms and classifications 
tailored to the needs of the task. The characteristics and difficulty of the tasks are 
determined by the complexity and variety of the natural history of disease 
processes and their corresponding diagnostic, treatment and administrative 
procedures. At the end, with so much volume of task information and health data, 
the decision making process is so difficult (Raghupathi and Raghupathi, 2014).  
An Australian study about hospital doctors found that they spent about 33 % of 
their time in communicating with fellow professionals, compared with 15% of their 
time in direct care. 70 % of the tasks performed by junior hospital doctors 
(Benson and Grieve, 2016c) was with another member of staff, usually another 
doctor. Interns spent twice as much time on documenting (22 %) as on direct 
care (11 %) (Rodriguez et al., 2010). So, communication is playing a critical role 
in health domain and clinicians need excellent communication within their work-
group, between doctors, nurses and other professionals. Interoperability is 
nothing but communication among health systems so that the messages can be 
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exchanged effectively and understood clearly at both from the sending and 
receiving systems. The eHealth policies in Europe expected interoperability is the 
only sustainable way to maintain data transfer between two health organisations. 
To meet the current technical demands of the healthcare systems, the modern 
healthcare system architectures much achieve and implement interoperability in 
all the healthcare domains (Aguilar, 2005).  
 
 
The health messaging standards such as HL7 is used to improve the 
communication element so that the best interoperability can be achieved. Each 
ward in the hospital, process different sort of information as per their own need. 
Each department can run their preferred software platform. For example, the 
Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, a large hospital, processed up to two 
million HL7 messages a day, which then calculates to 660 million messages a 
year.(Benson and Grieve, 2016e). Establishing the interoperability between these 
systems is hard and badly need a procedure or standard to understand the 
transaction messages (Vernadat, 2010). 
 
 
Interoperability basically has four layers. These layers are namely technology, 
data, human, and institutional. Technical interoperability is domain independent. 
The data exchanged in the technical interoperability will be independent. In other 
words, the technical interoperability does not care about the meaning of what is 
exchanged.  The data or semantic interoperability is specific to domain and 
context and it needs unambiguous codes and identifiers (Benson and Grieve, 
2016e). To allow computers to understand, interpret, use and share data without 
any mistake is what semantic interoperability does. Both the receiver and sender 
of this data need to recognise it in the same way.  Achieving a semantic 
interoperability in eHealth domain is challenging. The recommendations of the 
European Commission have stated that the semantic interoperability of EHR 
systems is essential to improve the quality and safety of patient care, clinical 
research, public health, and health service management (Martínez-Costa et al., 
2010). The process or human interoperability is achieved when human beings 
manage to share a common understanding of different business systems and 
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achieve a coordinated process by working together. People achieve benefits 
when they use information originating elsewhere in their day-to-day work. 
Process interoperability ensures seamless communication between different 
healthcare systems by developing the shared understanding of their process 
artefacts (Khan et al., 2013). The institutional or clinical interoperability is specific 
to the healthcare field and is defined as the ability for two or more clinicians in 
different care teams to transfer patients and provide seamless care to the patient. 
Clinical interoperability is a subset of process interoperability. To improve safety 
in medical environments, there is a need to develop interoperable medical 
devices that can automatically operate with safety interlocks so as to operate 
without a human in the loop (Kim et al., 2010). This is to increase interoperability 
among medical devices to reduce accidents caused by human errors (Kim et al., 
2010). Semantic and technical processes and clinical interoperability are co-
dependent, and to deliver substantial business benefits to the healthcare domain 
they are all necessary. Every health organisation maintains their patients’ health 
records with the organisation approved standard. If they would like to exchange 
their health data with other health organisation and if they both follow the same 
standards, the health data might be exchanged efficiently without any major 
issue. However, if both organisations follow different standards, the data is not 
interoperable or exchangeable between these organisations. Even with the same 
standards, the data schema might not be same due to their preferred operating 
system. In both scenarios, the interoperability is not realised and ruined the 
benefits of eHealth initiatives (Batra and Sachdeva, 2016). This is a tiny example 
of interoperability’s role in improving the progress of eHealth services.  
 
 
Using web services, XML based messaging standards and service oriented 
software architecture instead of the closed database (Pearce et al., 2011) could 
fix the interoperability issues in the current healthcare domain. The Australian 
federal government allocated $466.7 million over 2 years in its 2010 budget for 
MyHR (My Health Records), previously known as Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) (Pearce and Haikerwal, 2010). However, the 
Australian healthcare system lags behind all other sectors of the economy. The 
hospital sector is not computerised well enough compared to general practice 
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and community pharmacy. The general practice and community pharmacy 
sectors’ data are not integrated into hospital sectors. Moreover, every health 
organisations function like a silo and health data are not shared and interoperable 
between organisations. Considering the extensive benefits offered by the eHealth 
initiatives, it is worth to resolve all these interoperability related issues associated 
with MyHR initiative. 
 
 
2.4 Security technologies in Healthcare 
eHealth security includes the protection of data integrity, availability, authenticity, 
confidentiality and privacy (Dritsas et al., 2006). eHealth security is critical to gain 
health professionals’ and patients’ trust and acceptance to use the eHealth 
systems efficiently. The privacy law to protect patients’ confidentiality should be 
followed by healthcare providers. At present, all countries are facing breaches on 
privacy data persistently. The main reason for these data breaches is to steal the 
privacy data (McCann, 2014). These discouraging acts will create negative 
impacts to health professionals and patients to accept and keep their privacy and 
medical data in EHR system. Privacy data associated with health data may be 
used to harm the data owner by the negative individuals with cruel intent. Once 
these negative individuals recognize the value of the personal medical and health 
data, then they use both external and internal attack to steal the privacy data (Al 
Ameen et al., 2012). Any organisation’s reputation will be damaged by the cyber-
attacks (Team, 2015)  and afterwards the customer trust on these organisations 
will be lost. Verizon's report evaluates the cost per record, linked with specific 
damage cost on privacy data associating with every kind of cyber-attack. Lisa 
Gallagher, HIMSS (Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society) 
senior director of privacy and security, when addressing the 2012 Boston privacy 
and security forum, revealed that around 40 to 45 million patient records have 
been compromised.  
 
 
The resolution for these security issues can be achieved when the nature of the 
threat is identified and analysed properly. At the time of eHealth application 
security design, adequate time and effort should be spent appropriately. A 
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suitable security pattern should be adopted to achieve the right security solution 
(Schumacher et al., 2013). The well-proven and existing security models should 
be adapted to design and promote effective software design practices (Dritsas et 
al., 2006). Peace of mind of patients is the main goal to be considered and to 
achieve this goal, audit trails and access-based model such as role-based access 
to different healthcare services must be enabled to address these eHealth 
challenges (Win, 2005). Identification using biometrics and RSA token device 
based electronic tag with additional security code will also strengthen and provide 
improved authentication mechanism. There are several other security standards 
such as e-certificate, digital signature and multi-factor authentication are available 
to safeguard the privacy data and make sure these privacy data can be managed 
by authorised users. The traditional authentication pattern using logon ID and 
password is a weak means of data protection as the password can often be 
compromised and accidentally revealed.  A multi-factor authentication is a right 
solution to overcome this authentication issue and it is useful to improve the 
overall security process (Fung, 2006).  
 
 
e-Certificate is a digital file that authorises and identify the key ownership of an 
individual or an organisation or a computer based system. There are few 
recognised Certificate Authority in Australia. National Authentication Service 
(NASH) is a certificate authority in Australia who is the provider of Health Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates. Healthcare providers and supporting 
organisations must have a National Authentication Service for Health (NASH) PKI 
certificate to access the My Health Record system. NASH issues public keys and 
software to generate private keys for individuals to access MyHR (My Health 
Records), securely share data between MyHR and health information software at 
clinician end and access the NASH PKI directory (Shen et al., 2012). A 
healthcare provider, a contracted service provider, or a general supporting 
organisation that assists in the delivery of digital health (IT company) who are 
registered in the Healthcare Identifiers (HI) are eligible to apply PKI from NASH 
(Coles et al., 2013). 
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Digital signatures are analogous to ordinary physical signatures on paper which 
bind the message origin to the exact contents of the message. It establishes 
sender authentication and message integrity. A tamper resistant and persistent 
evidence of "who did what to whom" can be created by a digital signature, which 
is important for any compliance requirements and carry out high legal risks 
related tasks. Transaction integrity, authentication and non-repudiation are 
achieved using digital signatures. The digital signature in the document is to 
ensure that it is reliable and validated document, and any act of changing the 
document after it is signed will invalidate the digital signature that is on it. Since 
the owner of a digital signature cannot later deny that he or she signed the 
document (Menezes et al., 1996), the assurance on non-repudiation of document 
origin can be achieved easily. PKI certificates use secure hash algorithm (SHA) 
technology to send secure messages and other transactions online. A hash 
function takes a variable length input and returns a shorter output of fixed length. 
MD5 and SHA-1 are two modern hash functions available. MD5 was designed by 
Ronald Rivest in 1991 (Li, 2003), was widely used. SHA-1 was designed by 
National Security Agency (NSA) in 1993. It was popularly used in SSL, PGP, 
SSH and S/MIME certificates. Digital signatures bind the authority information 
directly to messages and Digital certificates can convey credentials, licences, 
affiliations and other similar authority information, to streamline the transaction 
processing (Wilson, 2005). 
 
Apart from the main security standards such as digital certificates, cryptography 
and multi-factor authentication, there are few other techniques such as 
anonymisation, pseudonymization (Neubauer and Heurix, 2011) and audit trails 
can also be used to protect patients' data. Anonymization is the process of 
removing personal and identifiable elements from the data (Kushida et al., 2012), 
which makes it lesser subject to stringent privacy regulations of personal data 
and less sensitive while maintaining its value for legitimate purposes. 
Pseudonymization is the process of replacing the personally identifiable data with 
other values (Gilbert et al., 2001) such as replacing a patient ID with an arbitrary 
number. Audit trails preserve a record of activities occurred in the past on the 
electronic health information. The patient identification, user identification, activity 
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date and  time  (Shamos, 1993) are logged when electronic health information is 
accessed, modified, created, or deleted, with a log of which actions occurred and 
by whom. Every transaction is logged and can be tracked. The log file can be 
used to detect any abnormal activity patterns and subject to routine observation. 
 
Security when communicating with partner health organisations is critical. There 
are different aspects to be covered during the health message communication. It 
can be characterised by communication content, partners, infrastructure, and 
services. These present different communication conditions and may lead to 
diverse security threats and demands the suitable countermeasures (Blobel, 
1997). If the security is implemented at the message level, then the message 
data size will increase to accommodate the additional security features (Voos et 
al., 2010). Basically, the security in the communication between the system and 
the web server is established using transport level or message level security. To 
avoid the complexity of implementing encryption and signing software 
components at both ends of the communication channels, and to reduce the 
message size, many eHealth systems offer transport level security. However, 
transport level security has the main disadvantage, which is the message could 
be changed without detection at an intermediary point. 
 
Encryption at the message level can be completed by few different patterns. 
Implementing encryption and component signing at both communication 
channels or using a SOA, service oriented architecture or by enabling suitable 
web service. When an XML message is added with a security feature, it will 
increase the message size during communication from one system to another.  
Since the message size is the critical factor when transferring data from one 
health organisation to another or from one ward to another in the same hospital, 
implementing the security in the web layer is optimum. This will enable efficient 
data communication between health organisations. FHIR has few open source 
solutions such as SMART (Substitutable Medical Applications, reusable 
technologies) FHIR APIs. The SMART FHIR APIs can be integrated easily with 
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REST (Representational State Transfer) based health messaging standards. H7 
V3 can use these features using the RIM (Reference Information Model) features. 
 
 
 
2.5 Privacy technologies in healthcare  
The law of privacy to ensure patients’ privacy data and confidentiality should be 
followed by healthcare providers carefully. All countries have legislation to protect 
health information privacy. However, all countries are facing challenges in privacy 
data breaches. Privacy data stealing (McCann, 2014) is the main reason for 
these data breaches. These discouraging acts will create negative impacts to 
general public and patients who prefer to keep their medical data in EHR system 
which subsequently resists the progress of further eHealth growth. 
 
 
As per NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002, health data must 
not be exposed to anyone other than for its prime purpose. Explicit consent 
should be attained before processing the health and medical data. In specific 
situations such as a health professional who undertook the task and owes a duty 
of confidentiality  (Win, 2005) and the medical data are required for an urgent 
medical needs may be excluded.  However, in certain circumstances, the consent 
model may not be executed as per the Information Privacy Act such as patient’s 
violent behaviour and their emergency status and threat to public safety. To cover 
this scenario, the consent model in healthcare services needs to be categorised 
and implemented according to their category. There are few different types of 
consents (Coiera and Clarke, 2004),  such as ‘General Consent’, ‘General 
Denials’, ‘General consent with specific denials’ and ‘General denial with specific 
consent’ to balance patients’ privacy and health professional’s efficient service 
delivery. According to the practical implications, these consent models need to be 
amended and implemented in the current EHR services and applications. 
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HL7 privacy related standards for HL7 version2, version 3 and FHIR are targeted 
for the audience  such as public health laboratories and clinics, immunisation 
registries, standards development organisations (SDOs), local and state 
departments of health, pharmaceutical vendors, EHR, PHR vendors, equipment 
vendors, quality reporting agencies, regulatory agency, health care IT vendors, 
clinical decision support systems vendors, lab vendors, HIS vendors, emergency 
services providers, medical imaging service providers and  healthcare institutions  
such as hospitals, long term care, mental health and home care (Health-Level-
Seven-International, 2017c). HL7 messaging standards (all versions) address 
many key objectives. Identify important concepts in the area of privacy and 
security in the IT domain, establish standardised names for concepts in the area 
of healthcare IT security and privacy, provide clear, precise textual definitions to 
concepts in the area of healthcare IT security and privacy, constitute an 
authoritative ontology such as formally and unambiguously defined using OWL, 
Ontology Web Language and classified in an organised taxonomy, support 
consistent and effective Healthcare IT software implementations, especially by 
enabling security and privacy systems, align with other Healthcare IT 
terminologies such as SNOMED CT and the HL7 vocabularies (Health-Level-
Seven-International, 2017c). 
 
 
2.6 Interoperability, Security and Privacy in healthcare messaging 
The interoperability, security, and privacy are closely related to each other. For 
better interoperability, the eHealth application security should be strong and 
reliable. The healthcare domain has a specific set of regulations for security and 
privacy related matters. Privacy, according to the Healthcare Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, is defined as an individual’s interest in 
limiting who has access to his or her personal healthcare information. (Kahn and 
Sheshadri, 2008). It also specifies that all the physical, administrative and 
technical safeguards in an information system must be encompassed by security 
measures. For healthcare providers, a set of rules and regulations has been 
established by the HIPAA, demanding that uses of protective health data not 
needed for payment, treatment or operations be limited, that all employees are in 
covered entities and that all patients be informed of their privacy rights. 
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There are two main security concerns within the EHR systems (Kahn and 
Sheshadri, 2008) which are access and transmission security. The healthcare 
delivery organisation’s ability to ensure that system access is granted only to 
appropriate individuals is referred to as access security (Alhaqbani and Fidge, 
2007). The healthcare’s ability to ensure that transmitted data is secured from 
potential security threats is referred to as transmission security. Whoever has the 
authority to create usernames should be designated by the healthcare delivery 
organisation, and the organisation should disable authority to anyone who leaves. 
User identification should not be shared, but should be individual. Access should 
also be based on roles. The minimum access that is necessary for he or she to 
perform their job is required. Firewalls would be required for internet-facing 
remote access solutions as to limit access to certain devices, such as remote 
access servers.  
 
 
Healthcare providers have been able to enable eHealth services to share and 
export aggregated administrative and clinical data electronically with patients and 
other healthcare providers. This is possible due to recent developments in 
eHealth services. Until the release of CCR, Continuity of Care Record, 
interoperability issues limited the capability to share healthcare data electronically 
between healthcare providers. However, the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ATSM) unveiled the CCR in June 2005. The CCR had various data 
elements with demographic information appearing at the top, which was followed 
by clinical information and a plan of care, all based on a paper form. Extreme 
strict rules for both implementation and vocabulary are in place for any healthcare 
delivery organisation that exports CCRs. Later HL7 international organisation 
worked with ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) to harmonise the 
CCR with CDA (Clinical Document Architecture) which has improved the 
interoperability and helped to exchange the required health data between 
healthcare providers. The new joint standard, the Continuity of Care Document 
(CCD), lets institutions aggregate the data sets defined in the CCR and share this 
information electronically with HL7 messaging. In a paper-based office, the 
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privacy of protected medical information depends entirely on the physical 
safeguards the office maintains. This is almost same for the digital office as well. 
It is not possible to eliminate all the paper in a patient’s medical records. HIPAA 
privacy policies require that protected health information in any office be kept 
from the general public’s view at all times (Kahn and Sheshadri, 2008).  
 
As part of the study, a detailed search was conducted in the existing research 
papers to gather analysis information about health messaging standards 
comparison focusing on features interoperability, security and privacy. Here are 
the details with research article title and its coverage about interoperability, 
security and privacy. 
 
Research  Article Title Comparison information about  interoperability, security and privacy 
in HL 7 v 2 and 3 and FHIR 
HL7 FHIR: An Agile and RESTful 
Approach to Healthcare Information 
Exchange (Bender and Sartipi, 2013) 
This research article has covered the basic details about the 
evolution of the HL7 messaging standards mostly on HL7 FHIR. In 
addition, there is a comparative analysis between HL7 FHIR and 
previous HL7 messaging standards on features such as semantic 
interoperability, architectural paradigm and other general support 
related aspects. The research did not provide any details on security 
and privacy related features. It did not provide adequate details on 
interoperability. 
A comparison of two Detailed Clinical 
Model representations: FHIR and 
CDA (Smits et al., 2015) 
This research article has explained the Detailed Clinical Model 
(DCM) paradigm which is to separate the data models from their 
underlying technical data model. Further, this research compares the 
implementation of DCM in HL7 CDA and FHIR. This is slightly 
covering the interoperability issues by transforming a message from 
CDA to FHIR. Here, Security and privacy features in CDA and FHIR 
are not compared. 
Standard Guide for Implementing EDI 
(HL7) Communication Security 
(Blobel et al., 1998) 
This research article has covered the communication security when 
implementing HL7 messages. However, the article release date is 
sept 1998 and it is clearly outdated. Though it has covered the 
security aspects up to protocol level, it might not be very useful with 
the modern technological advancements with sophisticated security 
enablement with web services. HL7 V3 with RIM and FHIR have 
latest security features which were not available during this article 
release. Also, there are no details covered on interoperability and 
privacy related features. 
FHIR: Cell-Level Security and Real 
Time Access with Accumulo (Ruiz, 
2016) 
This research article has covered cell-level security for HL7 FHIR 
messaging standard. The interoperability and privacy aspects are not 
covered in this article. 
Towards a HL7 based Metamodeling 
Integration Approach for Embracing 
the Privacy of Healthcare Patient 
Records Administration (Feltus et al., 
2014) 
This research article has covered the metamodeling integration 
approach to cover privacy and related interoperability. However, 
there is no comparative analysis done with other HL7 messaging 
standards. 
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DMAG contribution to the HL7 
Security and Privacy Ontology 
(Delgado et al., 2010) 
 
This research article has covered privacy ontologies and related 
standardisation process which is specific to HL7 security related 
methods. However, there is no comparison with other HL7 
messaging standards on interoperability and privacy related features 
done. Moreover, the security details about the messaging details are 
not covered in detail. 
An application of the Privacy 
Management Reference Model & 
Methodology (PMRM) to HL7 consent 
directive use cases (Guinan, 2013) 
This research article has covered privacy related details, particularly 
privacy protection measures based on the Canadian’s electronic 
medical records system. The article used the methodology called 
Privacy Management Resource Model (PMRM) to analyse the HL7 
use cases. However, this article did not compare with other 
messaging models particularly for Interoperability, security and 
privacy features. 
Towards achieving semantic 
interoperability of clinical study data 
with FHIR (Leroux et al., 2017) 
This research article has covered the semantic interoperability 
benefits when studying the clinical data with FHIR based messaging 
standard. None of the HL7 version message standards except FHIR 
is analysed and compared in this article. Moreover, the security and 
privacy-related issues are not covered. 
Suitability of Fast Healthcare 
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) for 
Wellness Data (Pais et al., 2017) 
This research article has covered the wellness data to improve the 
interoperability between a healthcare provider and patient. The 
wellness data contains details such as blood glucose readings, blood 
pressure readings and Body Mass Index (BMI) data. The article has 
only analysed HL7 FHIR and no other health messaging standards 
are covered here. The security and privacy issues are also not 
covered. 
A Fast Healthcare Interoperability 
Resources (FHIR) layer implemented 
over i2b2 (Boussadi and Zapletal, 
2017) 
This research article has covered the feasibility of implementing a 
Java layer over the i2b2 database model to expose data of the 
clinical data warehouse as a set of FHIR resources. Though it has 
covered the semantic interoperability related features in FHIR, it did 
not cover enough details on the earlier versions of HL7 message 
standards. The security and privacy issues are not covered as well. 
Cyber-healthcare cloud computing 
interoperability using the HL7-CDA 
standard (Lubamba and Bagula, 
2017) 
This research article has analysed the interoperability in cloud and 
fog computing platforms. Most of the analysis was done using HL7 
CDA.  There is no comparison made on the HL7 messaging 
standards among version 2, version 3 and FHIR.  The security and 
privacy issues are not covered as well. 
 
The study process shows clearly that there is no such comparative study 
conducted in the past on the health messaging standards namely HL7 v2, v3 and 
FHIR to achieve interoperability, security and privacy cohesively.  
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(3) Research Objectives 
 
As the above literature review shows, there is relatively a large gap in research 
that cohesively and completely compare of healthcare messaging standards, in 
the presence of healthcare data standards, in order to ascertain the success of 
each messaging standard in achieving the security, privacy and interoperability 
needed in the health domain. Therefore this research project addresses this gap 
by associating interoperability, security and privacy issues by conducting 
comparative study on different health messaging standards. When comparing the 
different messaging standards, choosing the exact health standard which 
satisfies all the requirements of interoperability, security and privacy, is the prime 
objective. HL7 family products, HL7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR are the main standards 
to be compared for the features covering with interoperability, security and 
privacy. Exploring how these messaging standards interact with health data 
standards such as ICD, LOINC and SNOMED is also an objective of this 
research. The technical flexibility of using the latest technologies such as 
RESTful APIs, XML data transfer and JSON client side script approaches are 
additional requirements to choose the right health messaging standard. 
Implementation friendliness and cost to implement, training to health 
professionals and popularity are other minor considerations when selecting the 
right messaging standard. 
 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
Following is identified as the main research question of this study: 
  
Out of healthcare messaging standards, namely HL 7 v1, v2, v3 and 
FHIR, which is the best to achieve interoperability, security and privacy 
needed in the healthcare domain, with the appropriate use of healthcare 
data standards, in a cost effective and easily implementable manner? 
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As part of answering this research question, a comparative study is conducted 
and analysis is derived. The main research question raises these sub-questions: 
 
1. How does HL 7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR structurally differ from each other?  
2. How are these messaging standards practically implemented using 
other commonly known standards such as CDA (Clinical Document 
Architecture) and IHE (Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise)? 
3. What is the interaction between health messaging standards such as 
HL7 (Health Level 7), FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability 
Resources) with related health data standards such as SNOMED CT, 
ICD, DICOM and LOINC? 
4. What are the costs and training needs associated with the 
implementation of health messaging standards such as HL7 and 
FHIR?   
5. How does HL7 and FHIR compare in terms of effort needed in 
implementation?   
 
Section 5 captures the data required for answering the above sub-research 
questions 1 and 2. Followed by section 6 answering the sub-research question 3.  
Sub-research question 4 and 5 are answered in section 7, case study and in 
section 8, findings.  
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(4) Research Methodology 
 
The research method used in this project is a comparative study based on 
qualitative analysis.  It consists of studying the existing comparative studies 
conducted in the health messaging and data standards, discovers the gaps and 
proposes a solution for the identified gaps. The study process started from finding 
relevant literature in relation to core the identified sub-research questions.  The 
collected data is tabulated and analysed in arriving at a conclusion. 
 
 
 
The tools used to find appropriate and relevant papers are Google Scholar 
(https://scholar.google.com.au), Pubmed (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) 
and Western Sydney University online library (library.westernsydney.edu.au). 
Selected papers are first shortlisted based on the title and abstract. Shortlisted 
papers are further read to extract the information needed for this research.  
 
 
For the comparison of the health messaging standards, few specific criteria are 
selected. The comparison criteria were developed based on current literature that 
discusses the importance of each of them in the healthcare domain. The 
comparison criteria include: 
1. Interoperability method (Bender and Sartipi, 2013) 
2. Security (Blobel et al., 1998) 
3. Usage of encryption (Marshall, 2004) 
4. Privacy (Harispe et al., 2014) 
5. Compatibility (Mead, 2006) 
6. Flexibility (Mandel et al., 2016) 
7. Reliability (Mykkänen and Tuomainen, 2008) 
8. Granularity features (Yan et al., 2017) and  
9. Other miscellaneous features such as technology (Bender and Sartipi, 
2013), transport mechanism (Beyer et al., 2004), popularity (Bender 
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and Sartipi, 2013), adoption rate (Lin et al., 2012), and implementation 
cost (Bender and Sartipi, 2013). 
 
 The above features are used as the column headings of the comparison table. 
 
 
The comparison study result is summarised in table format with the features 
which are taken into the research study and how these features are handled by 
each health messaging standards such as HL7 V1, V2, V3 and FHIR. At the end 
of the tabulation of data, the recorded data were analysed to arrive at the 
conclusions. 
 
 
In order to understand the inner working of HL7 v1, V2, v3 messaging standards, 
a software tool HL7spy (Mann et al., 2011) was utilised. Further, a mock 
implementation of HL7 messaging testing was implemented in order to gain a 
better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each and also to gain 
an opinion on how easy the implementation of each messaging standard. The 
tabular data is recorded in a MS Word file and used for comparisons. 
 
 
There was a case study analysis conducted in eHealth, New South Wales (NSW) 
State to understand the popularity in usage of messaging standards and other 
ongoing challenges in the maintenance cost and training requirements. The 
complete study information is covered in detail in section 7 case study. 
 
 
There are few limitations which affect the proposed solution and the dissertation. 
The limited time did not allow to test the implementations for the full level that 
would facilitate the ease of implantation using a number of programmers. Only 
the findings of the researcher combined with what is recorded in the literature are 
reported here. Further, a thorough testing was not able to be completed in such a 
manner so that system is ethically hacked to understand the limitations of the 
messaging standards. 
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(5) Healthcare Messaging Standards 
 
HL7 standards are formed by HL7 International, which provides healthcare 
organisations with standards and specifications for enabling their systems 
interoperable. HL7 standards refer the application layer, which is layer 7 in the 
OSI, Open Systems Interconnection model. The OSI model consists of seven 
layers. The upper three layers are covering the application related functions and 
the bottom four layers are covering the transmission of data. There are three 
major versions of HL7, namely HL7 v1, v2 and v3. The earlier versions of HL7 v1 
are a simple prototype and no real implementations were done with those 
versions. HL7 V2 is the popular and most implemented version. HL7 V3 is RIM 
(Reference Information Model) based and less flexible as there are more 
compulsory details for medical records to be entered. 
 
5.1. HL7 Version 1 release 
The first version, HL7 version 1.0 (v1) was issued in the year 1987. Admissions, 
discharges and transfers (ADT) within hospitals were the initial focus of HL7. HL7 
v1 was the simple prototype and there was not any implementation done using 
this version.  Compared the later versions, especially HL7 version 2, HL7 version 
1 was the least implemented one. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.1 Sample ADT message with HL7 V1 (Spronk, 2014) 
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The handwritten correction on the PID (Patient Identification) section by the 
reviewer was due to the segment name change during the HL7v1 development 
process. 
 
5.2. HL7 Version 2 release, HL7 V2 
HL7 V2 (version 2) is the most commonly used healthcare messaging standard in 
the world (Eichelberg et al., 2005).  HL7 version 2.1 of HL7 was the first 
implementable version since its release. In HL7 V2, the messaging events are 
triggered upon receiving the HL7 messages. HL7 messages are structured and 
defined by an abstract message syntax table (Benson, 2012) and are categorised 
by segments. Segments hold fields and fields hold components. The components 
may hold subcomponents (Huang et al., 2003), which are separated by 
delimiters. The HL7 v2 messaging standard has been in development phase for 
more than 25 years (Health-Level-Seven-International, 2017a). The scope and 
size of HL7 v2 have changed significantly during its long development period. 
But, the base messaging design pattern is not altered. HL7 v2.0 was released in 
the year 1988, and this has covered a major addition to the reports for 
exchanging orders which are used for medical tests and treatment in hospitals. 
Then later HL7 v2.1 was released in the year 1991, which was the first widely 
used version. The complete documentation of HL7 v2 has almost one million 
words with 2500 pages. 
 
The abstract syntax for HL7 version 2 is as below: 
 
 
 
The design pattern of an HL7 v2 message to meet this requirement is: 
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Then when substituting the values, 
 
 
The above example shows the OBX component repeated. 
 
There are mandatory and optional segments. MSH, PID, PV1 and EVN are 
mandatory. PD1 is indented and nested inside the PID segment and this is an 
optional segment. NK1 is repeatable optional segment. Every segment starts with 
a three character identifier such as MSH and PID. The three character identified 
is followed by the pipe field separator, “|”. To indicate an empty field, two adjacent 
separators, “||” is used. To represent a null character, a character such as  |””| is 
used. Apart from the field separator, the component separator is represented with 
a hat character, “^”. Then the tilde, “~” character is used to represent the repeat 
separator. 
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5.3. HL7 Version 3 release, HL7 V3 
The presence of optional data segments in the HL7 V2 makes it as a flexible 
messaging standard.  However, these optional elements also make it impossible 
to have reliable data integrity when it comes to health messaging implementation. 
HL7 V3 solve this issue with a well-defined approach with much lesser optional 
segments and more reliable (Beeler, 1998) techniques. HL7 V3 uses a RIM, 
Reference Information Model with an object oriented development methodology 
to create messages.  
 
Table 5.3.1 RIM Core classes and its definition (NormanGilliam, 2017)  
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Figure 5.3.1 RIM Core Classes relationship (NormanGilliam, 2017) 
 
 
The RIM provides basic building blocks and structure for HL7 v3 messages. RIM 
has Act, Role and Entity as the main classes. There are linked together by Act 
Relationship, Participation and RoleLink (Dolin et al., 2006) association classes. 
The XPath notation is used to denote these classes and attributes. Act class is 
identified by Act-id and the Role class is identified by the Role-id (Umer et al.). 
HL7 v3 has two types of code. The first one covers the structural attributes and is 
defined by HL7 itself  and the second one covers the externally defined terms 
and code such as LOINC and SNOMED CT. The relationship part is managed by 
the RoleLink, association class which establish a relationship between two roles 
such as between jobs in an organisation chart. 
 
 
In HL7 v3, the RIM role is critical and considered as a healthcare interoperability 
universal reference model (Hasman, 2006), covering the whole health domain. 
The RIM backbone core classes, relationships and structural attributes. The 
structural attributes, classCode and moodCode determine the meaning of each 
class. Each class may have specialisations (Orgun and Vu, 2006)  and a 
predefined set of attributes. Each attribute further contains a data type. RIM 
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based model is too complex to learn and use. The XML attributes used in HL7 v3 
are derived from the HL7 v3 data types (Yuksel and Dogac, 2011).  HL7 v3 data 
schemas are complex, verbose and detailed. 
 
 
Each class in RIM has a pre-defined attributes and HL7 v3 allows only these 
messages. Each attribute has a specific data schema (Umer et al., 2012). These 
data schema and attributes represent the elements of HL7 XML messages. 
Refined Message Information Model, RMIM is a graphical representation of HL7 
v3 (Yuksel and Dogac, 2011) and shows the structure of a message as a colour 
coded diagram. HL7 provides a special toolset to support RMIMs functionalities. 
The new generation tools replace the old Microsoft Access and Visio tools which 
were the original toolsets available at the earlier time. Model Interchange Format 
(MIF) (Scott and Worden, 2012), a set of inter-related XML schema, is the basis 
of these tools. The primary artefacts which are defined by these MIFs, can be 
exchanged as a result of HL7 V3 standards implementation. 
 
 
HL7 Development Framework (HDF) (Lopez and Blobel, 2009), the HL7 v3 
standard development process, defines the RIM based governance  rules to 
derive the domain information models and the refinement of those models into 
HL7 standard specifications. The HL7 Version 3 Development Framework (HDF) 
is a continuous practice that strives to develop standards. HDF is the latest 
version of the HL7 V3 development methodology (Blobel et al., 2006). It supports 
to enable interoperability within healthcare application and services. In addition to 
the documents messaging, HDF covers the tools, actors, rules, processes and 
artefacts relevant to HL7 standard development specifications. HL7 specifications 
draw upon codes and vocabularies from a variety of sources. The HL7 V3 
dictionary work guarantees (Hasman, 2006) that the systems implementing HL7 
messaging standards have a clear and unambiguous understanding of the code 
sources and code value domains used in the HL7 specifications. HL7 v3 was 
implemented in places where there are little or no existing systems. 
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5.4. HL7 v3 - CDA, Clinical Document Architecture 
Clinical document architecture, CDA is the popular and the most widely adopted 
implementation of HL7 v3. Document is used to exchange the messages in CDA. 
There are three levels (Dolin et al., 2001) of document exchange pattern 
available in CDA. Level 1, single human readable document, Level 2 can include 
multi documents and Level 3 can include organised information. Level 1 with a 
human readable body has a header which contains basic metadata for 
information retrieval. For an example, a jpeg image, a pdf document, or a text 
document can be a body and possibly contain formatting markup. 
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Figure 5.4.1 Sample HL7 v3 CDA message (Dolin et al., 2006) 
 
 
Level 2 of CDA is similar to Level 1, as they have the same header but the body 
may be a blob (Binary large object) with an unstructured file format. CDA Level 3 
(Calamai and Giarré, 2010) allows both narrative block and structured data. 
Although Level 3 may seem complex, it offers the benefits of both machine 
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processed structured documents and human readable documents, making it 
more popular than Levels 1 and 2. 
 
 
The CDA defines HL7 v3 RIM based documents which include administrative and 
clinical data, for specific purposes. After the specific use, a consolidation effort 
removes the discrepancies of the initial documents, resulting in the current 
version called Consolidated CDA (CCDA) (Chronaki et al., 2014). The CCD is the 
key CCDA document which primarily used for transitions of care such as referring 
by a PCP (Primary Care physician) to a specialist. CCDA documents are 
reusable XML which are assembled from standard templates (Braunstein, 
2015a). Templates are constructed at the data entry levels which are very similar 
to paper form, such as forms used by physicians where specific medical details 
can be noted. 
 
 
 
5.5. IHE XDS, cross-enterprise document sharing 
IHE XDS (Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise cross-enterprise document 
sharing), is a common portal to share documents between different healthcare 
enterprises. The document metadata is kept in the XDS registry, which can be 
used to find out and retrieve the right search results (Dogac et al., 2006) stored in 
XDS repositories. The IHE XDS collaborative and distributive approach share 
clinical documents that are held by different healthcare organisations. The 
Registry and Repositories are physically and logically separate. The registries 
stores metadata and are used to retrieve the stored documents. The document 
repositories have the actual documents. Scanned letters, images, folders, results 
and other related documents can be received by the user from one or more 
repositories in a consistent and quick way through user applications connected 
with XDS. 
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Figure 5.5.1. IHE XDS, Cross Enterprise Document Sharing Model 
 
As indicated in the figure 5.5.1, the documents are submitted to Document 
Source, usually, HL7 CDA XML documents, to a local Document Repository with 
the metadata details about each document. The Document Repository provides a 
persistent storage for all documents and prepared metadata and submit to the 
Document Registry. Then a distinct Id is generated for each document for 
Document Consumer to retrieval at a later stage. The local repository still holds 
these documents and each care provider registers the data they would like to 
share with other care provider. The user application such as Document 
Consumer submits search criteria to the registry to locate (Duftschmid et al., 
2013) documents that meet the specified search condition. The Document 
Registry returns the specific identifier with the location and a metadata list from 
Document Repositories. A distinct identifier is generated for each patient in the 
affinity domain by the Patient Identity Source. The IHE PIX/PDQ (Patient Identity 
Cross-referencing / Patient Demographics Query) (Benson and Grieve, 2016d) 
server may be used to provide the Patient Identity Source. The patient 
demographic details are retrieved from multiple patient identifier domains using 
Patient Demographics Query, PDQ and Patient Identity Cross-Referencing, PIX, 
(Melament et al., 2011) is used for cross- referencing of patient identifiers. 
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The best example to illustrate the successful implementation of the IHE XDS is 
the BioMIMS, a SOA Platform for Research of Rare Hereditary Diseases 
(Melament et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 5.5.2 BioMIMS - SOA Platform for Research of Rare Hereditary Diseases 
 
As per the BioMIMS, SOA platform, the required medical images are retrieved 
and uploaded to and from the relevant system service with the DICOM v3.0 
format. The details of clinical history are transferred according to HL7 v2.x and 
HL7 v3 standards. The patient identifier's data type might be different from each 
system. For the patients’ identification and their data integrity, IHE Patient 
Identifier Cross-Reference (PIX) and Patient Demographic Query (PDQ) 
transactions are used. This allows a single holistic view of combining patients' 
data which are gathered from different research centres. The metadata is 
extracted according to IHE Cross-enterprise Document Sharing (XDS/XDS-I) 
profiles. The advantage of this IHE XDS architecture is the scalability (Melament 
et al., 2011) of each service layer. The decoupled architecture can be easily 
upgraded without any effect on the other services implementation. 
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5.6. Fast Healthcare Interoperability Standards, FHIR 
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Standards, FHIR, was established after the 
earlier HL7 Standards such as HL7 v2, v3 had trouble with implementation 
issues. FHIR is implementation focused and is built based on RESTful interfaces. 
All resources in FHIR have references to other resources (Smits et al., 2015), 
extensions, and a XHTML view which is human readable.  
 
 
Though HL7 V3 have more advantage than HL7 v2 on consistent definitions and 
structure, it was complex, time consuming to learn and hard to use. However, 
FHIR addressed all these issues as FHIR is more on implementation focused 
(Kasthurirathne et al., 2015) and built with RESTful interfaces. Resources for 
Health, RFH (Benson and Grieve, 2016d) was the first draft version of the FHIR 
and it was based on a RESTful API. RESTful paradigm is used by many 
organisations and published numerous web APIs. The companies such as 
Google, Apple, Facebook and Twitter are few who are using REST based web 
APIs (Gravina et al., 2017). The interoperability specifications in FHIR can be 
grouped into different specifications such as messages, Services and documents.  
 
 
For data transfers between healthcare systems, FHIR is used as a general 
messaging standard. Therefore, compared with normal RESTful APIs, FHIR 
specification is more flexible and wide. In addition, Healthcare information can 
easily be exchanged across RESTful APIs. FHIR extends support specification 
(Bender and Sartipi, 2013) for messaging and document approaches using 
RESTful APIs. 
 
 
The sample URL for FHIR will display as below: 
http://server.sample.com/fhir/Patient/45678 
The URL has three sections: [base-address]/[Type]/[id] 
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Table 5.6.1:  FHIR URL Structure (Peterson et al., 2016) 
 
The base feature of FHIR is that every resource contains a narrative, or a human 
readable form. The narrative is in limited HTML, containing text, images, lists, 
tables and styles. However, it does not contain scripts, forms, objects or the use 
of local storage and other similar active content. The data exchange in FHIR API 
uses record centric approach (Benson and Grieve, 2016d) which initiates the 
client to not ask the server to perform some operation, but rather tell the server 
what the contents of the record should be. These are basically called as CRUD 
services, since the client can do tasks such as Create, Read, Update and Delete 
records. Each FHIR resource has a UML definitions, JSON and XML templates. 
All resources have a set of common data, and also have a set of data elements 
using common data types. The FHIR logical definition which defines all the types 
(Benson and Grieve, 2016d), represented by a UML diagram or logical table with 
specific JSON  and XML representations. 
 
 
HL7 FHIR supports multiple paradigms with a great flexibility and simply offers 
the modern governance of data. FHIR enabled extensions and APIs have been 
made available to C#, Java, JavaScript, Objective C, Delphi and similar 
programming systems. Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon organisations are 
embracing RESTful (Christensen, 2009)  web services as their prime API. The 
related technologies such as XML, JSON, and OAuth (Cabarkapa, 2013), with 
suitable encoding and authorisation techniques are also used commonly in FHIR.  
With all these FHIR supported technologies and tools the healthcare industry is 
not isolated into specific industry standards but can embrace what is used across 
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all industries. The base requirement of the concept of human readability was 
introduced with the HL7 CDA standard. Because of this, data could be viewed in 
a standard web browser, which was the idea. This concept is continued by HL7 
FHIR to ensure that the option of human readability will always be available. 
 
 
The success of FHIR relies on the security and of patient data, which is of utmost 
importance and it further supports the governance and related maintenance. 
FHIR enable policies to be built in a way that is protective to the system but not 
restraining and limiting the capabilities. The data exchange secured with the 
TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security / Secure Sockets Layer) and suitable 
authentication can be made in a number of ways. OAuth (Bloomfield et al., 2017) 
is the preferred and recommended practice for web centric use. HL7 FHIR fully 
supports workflows from small devices such as mobile to large hospital 
information systems. FHIR enables traditional communications between related 
healthcare applications, patient engagement and other workflows. FHIR can 
enable any outside open source applications and services which further enable 
the latest and sophisticated extensions of healthcare services. In addition to the 
normal content, FHIR resource can carry one or more extensions. As per the 
FHIR resource format, a value in XML format and a URL that identifies the 
extension is shown below: 
 
     <extension url="http://hl7.org/fhir/StructureDefinition/iso21090-en-qualifier"> 
<valueCode value=" NB"/> 
</extension> 
 
 
The URL retrieves (Peterson et al., 2016) a formal definition of the extension that 
the URL indicated. This will allow the system to process and display this data. 
The base FHIR data types have the value and data type of the extension. Without 
accessing the definition of the extension, FHIR data types allow every 
implementation can write and read the relevant extensions. The implementers 
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are encouraged to, through their local affiliate or HL7 itself, register their 
extensions with HL7. HL7, with the support of FHIR specification, provides strong 
social networks to encourage responsible use of these extensions. HL7 advertise 
users to register extensions and help to leverage social media to consult with the 
community specialists so to avoid needing to make their own extensions. 
 
 
The SMART on FHIR is such an extension (Mandel et al., 2016), and its 
specifications provide means for healthcare organisations to access clinical data 
such as lab results, medications, problems, immunisations and patient 
demographics. FHIR tries to use the best features of HL7 v2 and v3 and fill the 
gaps that exist with the messaging standards today. In addition, other standards 
organisations are prepared to support HL7 in the FHIR development process.  
IHE International is one of those organisations, which plan to enable FHIR across 
MHD (mobile XDS), VPIXm/PDQm (patient identification), X mACM (alerting) and 
several other profiles. 
 
 
FHIR was built to improve security using HTTP(s) and provides a more strongly 
defined model with easy customisation. FHIR is REST based which enables 
organisations and developers to implement and use it easily. Since it is easier to 
implement (Bender and Sartipi, 2013) and use compared to HL7 v2 and v3.  It 
translates into cost savings and greater ROI from the service itself versus 
something like HL7 v2 and v3 which might need more customisation. The FHIR 
team has adopted the priorities with the focus on support cross industry web 
technologies, implementers, engage human readability at the base level of 
interoperability and make content available freely (Hughes et al., 2017). However, 
FHIR is still early on and read only. Though its goals are to reduce the obstacle of 
entry to the healthcare digital ecosystem, and FHIR hopes to solve that with an 
easier, more streamlined (Khalilia et al., 2015) REST-based interface. The future 
of FHIR is expected to be an evolving one because of the nature of it being open 
source (Mandel et al., 2016). This is important because the only way FHIR will 
continue to remain useful is if it is adaptable to trends and standards evolve.  
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(6) Healthcare Data Standard Usage within 
Messaging Standards  
The health data standards and message standards are interlinked to achieve the 
best possible interoperability.  The HL7 messages can specify a suitable LOINC, 
SNOMED or ICD codes so that the health data standards integrated into 
messaging standards efficiently. The linkage of HL7 with ICD, LOINC and 
SNOMED are discussed further in this section. 
 
 
6.1. ICD with HL7 
ICD is a set of tables being developed for health care financing administration 
(HCFA) by 3M Corporation and contains more than a million procedural codes 
(McDonald et al., 1998).  HL7 version 3 places in the RIM an explicit data 
semantics model from which implementing the messages locally and top-down. 
This stresses reuse of same codes across multiple contexts. Moreover, RIM has 
a systematic process for vocabulary support. It has a strong semantic foundation 
in explicitly defined concept domains drawn from the best terminologies such as  
ICD (Della Valle et al., 2005).  
 
 
As shown in the figure 6.1.1 (Kabak et al., 2008), validation rules for entry level 
constraints in the “Examination” EHR. The first rule states that the “code” of the 
“ClinicalDocument” should be “Examination”. The second rule states that 
“Examination”  (“MUAYENE”) and “Admission” (“KABUL’) sections should exist in 
the CDA Body. The third rule is an entry level rule and states that “Diagnosis” 
entry must exist in the “Examination” section and this element should obtain 
values from ICD-10. 
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Figure 6.1.1 ICD usage in HL7 standard (Kabak et al., 2008) 
 
The validation rule with HL7 CDA and ICD 10 is powerful for automation and 
share medical data between healthcare organisations. 
 
6.2. LOINC with HL7 CDA and FHIR  
The LOINC Document Ontology is a special set of LOINC codes (Regenstrief-
Institute, 2017c) that are built on a framework for naming and classifying the key 
attributes of clinical documents. The HL7/LOINC document ontology (DO) is an 
existing and evolving document standard developed to provide consistent naming 
of clinical documents and to guide the creation of LOINC codes for clinical notes. 
They provide consistent semantics for documents exchanged between systems 
for many uses. When there is a link for a local note title to LOINC codes is 
created, instead of cryptic and idiosyncratic note titles, there will be a principled 
set of document name attributes. With these systematic attributes, it's easy to 
create a logical navigation tree in the document viewer that pull back all the 
cardiology notes or discharge summaries. The HL7 Clinical Document 
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Architecture (CDA) standard specifies that the clinical document code for any 
CDA document (Dixon et al., 2015) should come from LOINC. Implementation 
guides like the consolidated CDA templates for clinical notes require LOINC 
codes to identify the document types. LOINC codes from the Document Ontology 
are required in the C-CDA value sets for documents such as consult notes, 
discharge summaries, progress notes, procedure notes and op notes.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 (Dolin et al., 2006) illustrate a representation of allergies 
and adverse reactions in a HL7 CDA document.  Here many required 
components are left out to simplify the example. A CDA document is wrapped by 
the <Clinical Document> element and contains a header and a body. The header 
lies between the <Clinical Document> and the <structured Body> elements and 
identifies and classifies the document. A CDA document section is wrapped by 
the <section> element. Each section can contain a single “narrative block” and 
any number of CDA entries and external references. The narrative block contains 
three items, of which one is also represented as a nested observation. That the 
patient has a history of hives is recorded as a distinct observation, which is then 
linked to another observation of penicillin allergy via an entryRelationship with 
typeCode of “MFST”. 
 
Figure 6.2.1 LOINC usage within HL7 standard (Dolin et al., 2006) 
 51           
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.2 LOINC usage within HL7 standard (Dolin et al., 2006) 
 
6.3. SNOMED with HL7 
On a much larger scale, we have SNOMED, Read codes, and the MED are 
covering code systems that provide the vocabulary necessary for coding clinical 
content including the coded values of HL7 in OBX-3 (McDonald et al., 1998). 
Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) documents are encoded with XML. They 
derive their machine processable meaning from the HL7 RIM and use the HL7 
version 3 data types. The RIM and the V3 data types provide a powerful 
mechanism for enabling CDA's incorporation of concepts from SNOMED CT. 
Post-coordination such as Observation.code, is allowed in CDA components that 
use the CD data type. For example, SNOMED CT defines a concept “cellulitis,” 
an attribute “finding site,” and a concept “foot structure,” which can be combined 
in Observation.code to create a post-coordinated expression (Dolin et al., 2006).  
 
 
As shown in figure 6.3.1 (Sáez et al., 2013), the approach is to facilitate semantic 
interoperability to rule-based CDSSs (Clinical Decision Support Systems) 
consists on syntactically and semantically relate the inference-engine knowledge-
base to standardized HL7-CDA input and output documents. The output of the 
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CDSS is generated following the proposed HL7-CDA template with the relevant 
SNOMED CT code as displayed in the figure 6.3.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.1 SNOMED usage within HL7 standard(Sáez et al., 2013) 
 
6.4. DICOM with HL7  
DICOM can be used between two different imaging systems. If two different 
systems, connected with the HL7 messaging standards, need to exchange an 
image data such as image data such as ultrasound, radiography, magnetic 
resonance imaging, nuclear medicine, echocardiography, topography CT and X-
Ray, then it can be translated or embedded within an appropriate HL7 message 
using DICOM.  
 
Patients’ clinical information exchange between healthcare facilities is an 
important requirement in the health domain. Medical images between the 
facilities can be shared using DICOM. MERIT-9, (MEdical Records, Images, 
Texts, -Information eXchange), a patient information exchange guideline using 
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MML, is the best example (Kimura et al., 1998) to illustrate the usage of DICOM 
with HL7. By MERIT-9, a patient's narrative episode which is described in MML, 
with detailed lab test results, prescriptions and diagnostic images supported by 
HL7 messages, DICOM files, TIFF files, etc. 
 
 
Figure 6.4.1  - MML file refers an HL7 message and A DICOM file (Kimura et al., 
1998). 
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(7) Case Study for the HL7 usage in eHealth, NSW 
Department of Health  
 
There was a case study conducted in eHealth, New South Wales (NSW) State to 
measure the usage of health messaging system in the NSW hospitals. At present 
(2017 Sep), eHealth, NSW organisation is using HL7 version 2.5. There are two 
different source systems used for Patient Administration System (PAS) in 
eHealth, NSW State. These PAS systems are based on Cerner and iPM 
systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. NSW Health PAS system connection with HL7 messaging standards 
 
As indicated in the image, CHW (Children's Hospital at Westmead), NCAHS 
(North Coast Area Health Service), NSCCAHS (Northern Sydney Central Coast 
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Area Health Service) and SSWAHS (Sydney South West Area Health Service) 
are using Cerner PAS. GWAHS (Greater Western Area Health Service), GSAHS 
(Greater Southern Area Health Service), JHAHS (John Hunter Area Health 
Service), SESIAHS (South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service) 
and AWAHS (Albury Wodonga Aboriginal Health Service) are using iPM PAS 
system. Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) is managing both PAS systems and 
converting the HL7 2.5 based health messages to standard XML format. These 
XML messages are consumed by all the internal health applications. The 
challenges such as identification format for patient ID and data type mismatch for 
patient records from two different systems are few known issues. The historical 
engagement of vendors by individual AHS and their own budget are the reasons 
for the existence of two different PAS systems. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows an example of one of the HL7 message consumer application 
in NSW Health organisation which uses the HL72.5 messaging system and its 
data feeds from systems such as EMR (Electronic Medical Records), EPR 
(Enterprise Patient Registry), billing and other reporting systems. The HL7 
messaging system connects very few systems and the remaining systems are 
connected either at the database layer or at the web layer. The message parsing 
mechanism used on these systems and its standard differs from the HL7 
messaging mechanism. 
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Figure 7.2. NSW Health sample consumer application with HL72.5 messaging 
system 
 
The interoperability is a big challenge in this environment. Any new changes in 
the internal health applications create changes to both PAS systems and a 
further increase in the maintenance cost. Any operating and system specific 
changes created in each PAS systems will create changes further into ESB 
system and other internal health applications which are consuming the PAS data. 
In addition to the HL7 connected systems, the PAS changes will create changes 
to the systems which are connected at the database and web layers. In addition 
to the cost, the training, associated implementation efforts and technology 
adoption to health professionals are additional challenges on interoperability. So, 
the recommendation from the case study is to have a centralised and 
interoperable PAS system and integrate rest of the systems which are not 
enabled with HL7 into a centralised HL7 messaging model to overcome the 
current ongoing issues with interoperability and maintenance cost.     
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 (8) Findings  
 
The comparative study was started from basic health data standards to advanced 
interoperability standards.  Standards such as ICD (International Classification of 
Diseases), LOINC (Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes), SNOMED 
CT (Systematised Nomenclature of Medicine - Clinical Terms), HL7 V2, V3 and 
FHIR were studied. Finally, a feature table covering the major HL7 versions and 
FHIR was derived. Features such as interoperability methods, security, usage of 
encryption, privacy, compatibility, flexibility, reliability, granularity features and 
other miscellaneous features such as technology, transport mechanism, 
popularity, adoption rate, and implementation cost were compared to different 
health standards. 
 
8.1. Interoperability methods 
The latest HL7 version 3 with reference information model (RIM) and FHIR 
support both syntactic (data syntax) and semantic (meaning) interoperability 
methods based on the usage of data in the context. In addition, FHIR uses 
REST-based approach to read and format EHR data using tools which supports 
JSON and XML technologies. JSON and XML technologies work at client side 
attached to any technology platform and covert to the required format. This 
allows flexibility in EHR server data format. In other words, the client side script 
can read the raw data and convert to the interoperable format required at the 
client end. The FHIR API significantly reduces the effort required to implement 
interoperability specific changes by preventing health developers (Technical) 
from having to learn or work with a domain specific API. RIM in HL7 v3 enforces 
the data types such as numbers, characters and null values with strict precise 
measures. This has created issues for the implementation team. Though it 
establishes stability and data integrity on patient data, due to the implementation 
struggles, it was not well received in the health domain (Bender and Sartipi, 
2013) . Compared to FHIR and HL7 version 3 health messaging standards, HL7 
version 2 is based on the Syntactic model. It used pipe (|) and hat (^) characters 
for delimiters. It primarily uses code to interoperate with other systems. If every 
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vendor has their own data standards, then establishing a standard interoperable 
connection between the supporting applications will be a big challenge. Though 
HL7 version 2 has many issues such as data stability and integrity, there were 
more implementations done using HL7 version 2 (Bender and Sartipi, 2013) as it 
is not complex like HL7 version 3 which was released to fix the data integrity 
issues in HL7 version 2. Moving from HL7 version to HL7 version 3 with RIM or 
FHIR to improve the interoperability, need a substantial volume of work.  Though 
FHIR appears to be having all the best features of HL7 v2 and V3, it is still in draft 
standard. 
 
8.2. Security 
For HL7 v2 and v3, the security layer is built in the transmission layer. In FHIR, 
with modern web services, the security such as SSL can be enabled in the 
transmission layer with https protocol. With FHIR, stateless interactions can be 
established and the required messages can be communicated in the URLs, 
headers and the body. There is no client context information stored at the server 
end. These specifications in FHIR makes very easy for client and server to 
communicate easily and securely. Since HL7 v2, v3 and FHIR are primarily 
established to manage the interoperability in the health messaging system and 
are not focused on the security standards, the security is to be done in a separate 
layer. Most of the implementation need communications security, authentication, 
authorisation, access control, Audit, digital signatures, content security, consent 
and data management policies. This entire security requirement can be fulfilled 
partly by the FHIR enabled features.  Web security protocols cover the rest of the 
security requirements. The security elements can be incorporated either server 
side or at the client side. Compared to HL7 v2 and v3, FHIR has richer client-side 
features where flexible security features can be enabled. FHIR have a set of 
open specifications called “Smart on FHIR”. This is used to integrate apps with 
healthcare data provider system such as EHR (Electronic Health Records). FHIR 
API combined with Smart on FHIR integration layer makes an efficient and 
secured FHIR based interoperable application. 
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8.3. Usage of encryption 
Encryption of data needs significant technical overhead and hence a separate 
protocol such as Secured socket layer, SSL (HTTPS) can be used to manage the 
encryption in all HL7 versions and HL7 FHIR standards. SSL works best with 
OAuth(Benson and Grieve, 2016b). With SSL (HTTPS), client and server are 
communicated using bidirectional encryption. It ensures that the communication 
between the website and the user cannot be forged by anyone. Due to the simple 
architecture of HL7 v2, it is easy to implement encryption in the transport layer. 
Since HL7 v3 have a complex architecture, enabling encryption is a tedious work. 
FHIR generally use open standards for encryption and other related 
functionalities. So it is easy to enable encryption layer for this version. Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) is a cost effective and simple solution for a secure 
connection in an open network. In addition to HTTPS, SFTP, FTPS, or SMIME 
protocols can also be used for the data transmission channels. However, HL7 
standards were adopted long before these standards. So enabling these 
protocols in HL7 v2 and v3 are not practical. However, these modern protocols 
can easily be enabled with FHIR and FHIR based related APIs. Different levels of 
the OSI model provide different protocols to secure data in transmission. Since it 
is difficult to store application-specific passwords, auditing, and rules, and to 
determine application-specific access rights, implementing the data protection at 
the application level is too difficult and complex for all HL7 versions and FHIR 
based health messaging standards (Marshall, 2004). 
 
 
8.4. Privacy 
Privacy related features are difficult to implement in HL7 v2. HL7 V2 is a well-
established messaging standard that works fine to connect applications within 
healthcare institutions. However, it has custom tools, unique syntaxes, and 
custom tools making it a legacy standard. It makes a hefty learning curve for 
those wanting to enter into the IT Healthcare industry. The design of this standard 
is also limited to more modern apps and devices which try to leverage patient 
data. Making patient data in a more convenient format and patient engagement 
now has a barrier due to these limitations.  HL7 V3 was based on a reference 
model and leveraged modern standards available at that time, however it became 
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even more overly complex to implement with a steep learning curve. Privacy 
features are easy to implement in HL7 v3 compared to HL7 v2. But the usage of 
HL7 v3 is less compared to HL7 v2. Backwards compatibility with HL7 V2 was 
also not available. With the latest HL7 FHIR, the privacy features are quite easy 
and flexible to implement (Benson and Grieve, 2016d). The success of FHIR 
relies on the governance to maintain the privacy of patient data. A flexible pattern 
in such a way that policies could not constrain but still be protective can be 
constructed by the modern capabilities of FHIR. In FHIR, The exchange of 
production data will be secured by TLS/SSL. OAuth is recommended for web-
centric use for authentication; however, it can also be achieved in a number of 
different ways. FHIR defines provenance and security event resources used for 
tracking down the origins, status, history, authorship and access to resources 
(Sánchez et al.). FHIR also defines Security Label infrastructures to support 
access control management. 
 
 
8.5. Compatibility 
All HL7 V2 minor versions are compatible with each other. But HL7 V3 is not 
compatible with earlier versions of HL7 v2. Some of the FHIR features are 
compatible with HL7 V3 and there is no compatibility with HL7 V2. HL7 RIM is a 
prime feature in the HL7 v3 messaging standards and all data components in 
HL7 v3 instances are derived from either from ISO data types or from the HL7 
RIM mappings. The derivation of serialisation format of FHIR is the minor 
difference as it is not driven by the RIM mappings. However, the organisations 
can implement FHIR with no skills and knowledge of the HL7 RIM. Compared to 
HL7 V2, V3 and FHIR have features to work best with LOINC, ICD, SNOMED 
and CPT. HL7 V3 CDA header can hold a XML body which can be coded with 
the RIM vocabulary such as SNOMED, ICD, LOINC and CPT.  Many other 
healthcare data ISO standards such as DICOM are in the process of being 
mapped to HL7 v3 messaging standard. A process with the name harmonisation 
is adopted by HL7 organisation to the map the required new structural codes to 
RIM. HL7 is encouraging and willing to enter harmonisation efforts with any 
standards organisation. The harmonisation efforts can be easily done with the 
HL7 v3 and FHIR based messaging standards. HL7 version 3 and FHIR have 
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features to enable SNOMED CT codes. However HL7 version 2 is limited and 
cannot work with SNOMED CT codes appropriately. 
 
DICOM is a popular standard used for the exchange of medical images such as 
X-rays, CT Scans, and MRI. DICOM community works closely with the HL7 
organisation and involve in the process to make image object selection resources 
available and related imaging study. FHIR resources use the availability of 
images from DICOM endpoints to the wider EHR system. However, this is 
complex task in HL7 v2 and v3 versions. Another important organisation which 
supports HL7 is IHE. IHE resolves few issues such as lack of agreement around 
use cases which cannot be resolved by HL7. Though IHE does not resolve the 
actual issue of disagreement around use cases, it allows a very narrow flexibility 
for a smaller people of possible stakeholders. The FHIR community collaborates 
closely with IHE in the Mobile Health Documents approach so to make resources 
such as DocumentReference, AuditEvent and DocumentManifest are available. 
These will expose XDS repositories over the RESTful interface. 
 
 
8.6. Flexibility 
Most of the HL7 v2.xx version based messaging standards are flexible to manage 
as there are very few mandatory details to be entered.  The HL7 V3.xx based 
messaging standard, which is based on RIM, reference information model, is less 
flexible as there are more compulsory and complete details for medical records 
need to be entered. FHIR is very flexible as it is compatible with the latest APIs.  
Since FHIR uses the RESTful API services, it is more flexible and easy to use 
with other API service providers. RESTful web services are embraced by 
organisations such as Amazon, Facebook and Twitter as their preferred API. In 
addition, OAuth, XML, and JSON are also well supported by RESTful services 
when dealing with encoding and authorisation functions. So, this flexibility will 
allow healthcare domain not be locked into unique industry standards but can 
embrace what is used in other industries. HL7 v3 is designed with the strict data 
type and consistent model. Any kind of healthcare communication is represented 
in the HL7 RIM based data types. Once the models become familiar to the 
implementer, they turn out to be less abstract. The HL7 v3 are extensive in their 
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coverage and capability and this will make the standard as more abstract. They 
are designed in this way to make sure to cover all other scenario and additional 
possible implementations. However, FHIR uses a different technique. FHIR 
resources do not represent all data elements that could possibly be used in a 
space. Instead, use those data elements which are expected in most of the 
implementations are considered part of the core resource definition. The 
extensions will be used to handle the rest of the data elements. Profiles are used 
define extensions appropriately and also to constrain resources. Serialisation 
format interoperability is used across all profiles on a given resource. 
 
 
8.7. Reliability 
Flexibility is the main reason for the more number of implementations and 
success of HL7 V2 compared to HL7 v3. Optional data segments and elements 
make it adaptable to almost any other healthcare applications or services. 
Though HL7 v2 provided the great flexibility, it contains many optional elements 
which make it hard for the reliable conformance tests when it comes to 
implementations. It forces the implementers to spend more efforts and time to 
plan and analyse the interfaces to manage the optional elements. So HL7 v2 is 
less reliable to depend on any medical records as there are more optional 
columns. RIM, Reference information model in HL v3 addresses the optionality 
issues in HL7 v2 with a strong message building techniques and analytic model. 
HL7 V3 is more reliable as most of the field entries are made compulsory. It helps 
to take the consistent decision. FHIR is expected to be more reliable as there are 
specific resources are maintained by the specialist. FHIR is also based on RIM 
and use the both the best features of HL7 v2 and v3. 
 
 
 
8.8. Granularity Features 
HL7 v2 models are restricted to enable granular features. Compared to HL7 V2 
models, HL7 version 3 models have more granular features which can be 
enabled based on the need. HL7 v3 models are categorised into 3 major types – 
payloads, wrappers, and CMETs (Common Message Element Types). To define 
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a set of content, these are combined into interactions. FHIR resources have the 
very similar granularity level of HL7 v3 models. HL7 FHIR has covered the good 
features of both HL7 v2 and v3 with more granular level.  It uses the latest web 
elements such as JSON and is fully focused on implementation. HL7 v3 models 
are categorised based on the re-use. FHIR models are categorised based on 
whether the objects they represent can be considered to stand alone. In HL7 v3, 
several models can represent the same essential healthcare information concept. 
For example, at the HL7 International level, there are 10 different CMETs for the 
concept of a patient. Further variation exists in the HL7 v3 models created by 
HL7 v3 implementers and affiliates. These CMETs has their own schema and 
may use different levels of nesting, different element names, and different 
constraints. But, in FHIR, there is only one Patient resource. Many profiles can be 
created on that resource, but each profile will use the same schema and support 
the same serialization format. 
 
 
 
8.9. Other miscellaneous features 
Under these miscellaneous sections, features such as technology, transport 
mechanism, popularity, adoption rate, and implementation costs are analysed. 
HL7 v2 models are based on implicit information model. It was built historically in 
an ad-hoc way because no other standard existed at the time of developing the 
messaging based standard. The HL7 version 2 technology is based on the old 
pipe hat characters encoding with limited features. HL7 version 2 does not have 
options to upgrade to latest tools and technologies. HL7 organisation and the 
respective health professionals spent many decades of efforts on HL7 v2.  The 
HL7 V2’s flexibility is what the success of it is largely attributable to. It is 
adaptable to almost any healthcare site, since it contains many optional data 
segments and data elements. Compared to HL7 v2, HL7 v3 model are based on 
RIM, Reference Information Model, which is an ultimate source from which all 
HL7 V3 standards draw their information-related content. HL7 v3 supports Object 
Oriented approach. HL7 FHIR has almost all the features and technologies of 
HL7 V2 and V3. In addition, it is flexible by enabling all the latest technical 
standards, APIs and extensions. HL7 FHIR is Http based RESTful protocol. The 
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transport mechanism in HL7 v2 is built by using the pipe and hat characters 
encoding. The conversion engine which understands the delimiters and separate 
data and control characters. In HL7 V3, XML is used as a transport method. So it 
is human readable. FHIR have an Option of XML or JSON structures. It is human 
readable XHTML display. Among the popularity, HL7 v2 is most popular, and this 
version is generally assumed as HL7. According to the survey conducted with the 
information and Health professionals who are currently working in the NSW 
Department of Health, HL7 v2.xx version messaging standards are implemented 
in most of the hospitals compared to other versions of HL7 messaging standards. 
Compared to HL7 V2, HL7 v3 is not famous. HL7 v3 CDA is generally assumed 
as HL7 V3. Due to the complexity and training requirements, HL7 V3 is not 
accepted well by the healthcare professionals. HL7 FHIR has all the best features 
of both HL7 v2 and V3. But it is still in draft standard. Depending on 
Implementation cost, flexibility and adoption rate, FHIR may become popular. 
Due to the flexibility and optional fields in HL7 V2, the adoption rate for v2 is high. 
However, the adoption rate for HL7 v3 is not high as v2. This is mainly due to the 
expensive implementation cost and training requirement for the health 
professionals with HL7 v3 RIM (reference information model) concepts. FHIR is 
in draft standard and may take considerable time to plan for resource repository 
and training to healthcare professionals. But still, the adoption rate of FHIR is 
expected to be high as it has the flexible transport and client-side features such 
as XML and JSON. In addition, FHIR can use open source extensions such as 
SMART FHIR APIs, an open source solution, using which a relevant function can 
be extracted and used in the popular health messaging standards. The 
implementation cost is low for HL7 v2 as it is message based. However, the HL7 
v3 implementation cost is expensive as v3 is RIM (reference information model) 
based and careful, time-consuming planning efforts are required to implement. 
Since HL7 v3 have less optional components and planned for long-term benefit, 
the implementation cost will not be realised easily. Also, HL7 v3 need a training 
requirement for health professionals. FHIR is in draft standard and it is expected 
to be less costly. But there is also a cost involved to retrain and retooling 
activities. 
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8.10. Comparison summary 
The summary of all the above mentioned features, when comparing HL7 V1, V2, 
V3 and FHIR are tabulated as below: 
Table 7.10.1:  HL7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR feature comparison table 
Feature HL7 - V1 HL7 - V2 HL7 - V3 FHIR 
Interoperability 
methods 
Syntactic only Syntactic only Support both syntactic 
and semantic 
approach 
Support both syntactic 
and semantic approach 
Security Basic Proto 
type 
Security is built in 
the transmission 
layer 
Security is built in the 
transmission layer 
Since FHIR is built 
using the web services, 
the security such as 
SSL can be enabled in 
the transmission layer 
Usage of 
Encryption 
Basic Proto 
type 
Encryption of data 
in transit needs 
significant 
technical overhead 
and hence a 
separate protocol 
such as SSL 
(HTTPS) can be 
used to handle the 
encryption. 
Similar to the 
encryption option 
available in HL7 v2 
version. However, due 
to the complex 
architecture, enabling 
encryption in the 
application layer is 
complex. 
Enabling SSL 
encryption (with https 
protocol) is very similar 
to HL7 v2 and v3 
versions. In addition, 
FHIR is compatible with 
many latest open 
standards and it is easy 
to use them in the 
encryption layer. 
Privacy Basic Proto 
type 
Privacy related 
implementations 
are difficult. 
Privacy and security 
are easy to implement 
compared to HL7 v2 
Privacy and security 
are quite easy and 
flexible to implement.  
ICD usage 
within HL7 
Basic Proto 
type 
Lacks a sufficiently 
robust 
infrastructure for 
specifying and 
binding concept-
based terminology 
values. Support to 
ICD is limited or no 
support. 
With the support of 
RIM various 
terminology 
Models and domain-
specific terminologies 
like ICD can be 
enabled efficiently. 
ICD can be easily used 
within FHIR with the 
advanced RIM and 
related features. 
LOINC usage 
within HL7 
Basic Proto 
type 
Limited support to 
LOINC binding 
With the RIM and 
semantic 
interoperability 
support, LOINC codes 
can be integrated into 
V3 easily.  
LOINC can be easily 
used within FHIR with 
the RIM and relevant 
advanced features. 
SNOMED 
usage within 
HL7 
Basic Proto 
type 
Limited support to 
SNOMED 
With the RIM and 
semantic 
interoperability 
support, SNOMED 
codes can be 
integrated into V3 
easily. 
SNOMED can easily be 
integrated within FHIR 
with the RIM and APIs 
such as SMARTAPI. 
DICOM usage 
within HL7 
Basic Proto 
type 
Limited support to 
DICOM 
With the RIM and 
semantic 
interoperability 
support, DICOM 
sections can be 
integrated into V3 
easily. 
DICOM can easily be 
integrated into FHIR 
with the support of RIM 
and other latest client 
side features such as 
JSON and XML.  
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Compatibility NA All V2 versions are 
compatible with 
each other (within 
V2.XX) 
V3 is not compatible 
with earlier versions of 
v2 
Few features are 
compatible with V3. No 
compatibility with V2. 
Flexibility NA More flexible as 
there are very few 
mandatory details 
to be entered 
Less flexible as there 
are more compulsory 
and complete details 
for medical records to 
be entered 
FHIR is in draft 
standard and it is 
expected to be flexible 
Reliability  NA Less reliable to 
depend on any 
medical records as 
there are more 
optional columns 
of medical data are 
allowed 
More reliable as most 
of the field entries are 
made compulsory. It 
helps to take 
consistent decision. 
Expected to be more 
reliable as there are 
specific resources 
(repository) are 
maintained by 
specialist. 
Granularity 
features 
Basic Proto 
type 
Restricted access 
to enable granular 
features 
Compared HL7 V2, 
more granular 
features are enabled. 
FHIR has the best 
features of HL7 v2, v3 
and CDA with more 
granular features. It 
uses the latest web 
standards and a tight 
focus on 
implementation. 
Other miscellaneous features: 
Technology Basic Proto 
type 
Implicit information 
model. Historically 
built in an ad-hoc 
way because no 
other standard 
existed at the time 
of developing 
messaging-based 
standard 
RIM, Reference 
Information Model. 
Many decades of 
efforts. 
Model-based 
standard. 
It supports Object 
Oriented approach 
Http-based RESTful 
protocol. 
FHIR is a  Model-based 
standard 
Transport 
Mechanism 
Basic Proto 
type 
Built with pipe and 
hat characters 
encoding. Parser 
which understands 
the delimiters and 
separate Data and 
control characters 
XML as transport 
method 
Option of XML or JSON 
structures, Human 
readable XHTML 
display, API based 
access 
Popularity NA Quite Popular. V2 
is generally 
assumed as HL7. 
Not very famous like 
V2. CDA is generally 
assumed as HL7 V3 
FHIR is still in draft 
standard. Depending 
on Implementation cost, 
flexibility and adoption 
rate, FHIR may become 
popular. 
Adoption rate NA High Low FHIR is in draft 
standard and may take 
considerable time to 
plan for Resource 
repository and training 
to healthcare 
professionals. 
Implementation 
Cost 
NA Since it is 
message based, 
the implementation 
cost is less 
Expensive and 
planned for long term 
benefit 
FHIR is in draft 
standard and it is 
expected to be low 
cost. But there is a cost 
involved to retrain and 
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retooling activities. 
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(9) Discussion 
 
The objective is to find out the best healthcare messaging standard, out of HL 7 
v1, v2, v3 and FHIR, to achieve interoperability, security and privacy needed in 
the healthcare domain. When HL 7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR are compared, on 
interoperability, security and privacy, there is a range of positive and negative 
impacts is realised.  
 
 
The security requirements can be achieved easily in FHIR, with the advanced 
web services support such as RESTful and JSON client-side scripts. Compared 
to HL7 v1, v2 and v3, FHIR has richer client-side features where flexible security 
features can easily be enabled. The combination of the Smart on FHIR 
integration layer and the FHIR API creates a secure and efficient, FHIR based 
interoperable application. The confidence to share the patients’ medical data 
between medical institutions and to transact online will increase due to the 
security issues being fixed. Because of this, the cost of capturing medical data 
such as their blood group and any other inheritance data will be reduced. This 
also helps to take appropriate decisions for medical emergencies when the 
patient is unconscious and their consent is required for critical medical conditions. 
 
 
Though HL7 V2 is a well-established standard, privacy related features are 
difficult to implement in V2. Privacy features are easy to implement in HL7 v3 
RIM compared to HL7 v2. But the usage of HL7 v3 is less compared to HL7 v2. 
With the latest HL7 FHIR, the privacy features are quite easy and flexible to 
implement. FHIR provides good support for all exchange of production data with 
suitable SSL enabled security. Authentication can easily be achieved in FHIR 
using oAuth or similar methods. FHIR also defines provenance and security 
event resources suitable for tracking the origins, authorship, history, status and 
access to resources. When the patients and the Australian public maintain their 
own personal medical data, they feel empowered. They will evidently feel 
responsible and reflect these changes in their healthier habits when a patient 
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takes initiative to maintain their own medical data. This will be helpful as patients 
can then receive clinical support over the phone or online for basic clinical 
treatments. Waiting times in hospitals would be reduced as prescriptions could be 
ordered online. Doctors and other healthcare professionals would have to learn to 
work smartly with these devices which are enabled as to provide services to 
patients remotely. However, the public may not disclose their specific health-
related information when it comes to employment or other insurance related 
claims if medical records are personally maintained, leading to few negative 
impacts. 
 
 
The interaction of HL7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR with health data standards such as 
ICD, LOINC, SNOMED CT and DICOM are analysed and provided in the 
comparison table. FHIR support both syntactic (data syntax) and semantic 
(meaning) interoperability when compared to the earlier versions of HL7 
messaging standards which makes FHIR suitable for easier adoption.  FHIR 
provides flexible support to JSON and XML technologies compared to the HL7 
v1, v2 and v3, which enable FHIR based messaging standard to be attached with 
any technology platform and covert to the required client side format. Due to the 
technical limitations, this is not possible at all with the earlier versions of HL7 
messaging standards. FHIR uses the HL7 supported SNOMED- CT extension 
namespace efficiently with the appropriate APIs which significantly reduces the 
effort required to implement interoperability specific changes. This will reduce the 
implementation challenges and further reduce the cost and efforts. The usage of 
interoperability can be extended for numerous wellbeing and preventive health 
activities, when interoperability is improved. For example, if a patient has medical 
data such as their blood pressure that is accessible on their mobile phone, when 
their blood pressure gets to a certain limit they would be warned with suitable 
messages. Regular weight measuring and other small health-related activities 
would also be captured, consolidated and stored to provide useful health data. 
Sharing healthcare data between different institutes would reduce time spent on 
interpreting the data and extra charges. The medical billing transactions between 
insurance companies and health organisations would be seamless as medical 
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data would be shared smoothly. This would further ease the process of claiming 
from the patients’ end.  
 
 
(10) Conclusion 
 
The objective of the research is to find out the best healthcare messaging 
standard, out of HL 7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR, to achieve interoperability, security 
and privacy needed in the healthcare domain, with the appropriate use. As per 
the literature review, case study and comparison study, FHIR seems to be the 
best healthcare messaging standard compared to the HL7 v1, v2 and v3. 
 
The comparison study covered the structure of HL7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR and their 
compatibility with other commonly known standards such as CDA (Clinical 
Document Architecture) and IHE (Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise). All these 
comparisons showed the leading status of FHIR compared to the other health 
messaging standards. The interaction of HL7 v1, v2, v3 and FHIR with health 
data standards such as SNOMED CT, ICD, DICOM and LOINC are analysed 
further and found FHIR is the better choice among others. 
 
The case study conducted in the NSW Department of Health reveals that HL7 
v2.xx version messaging standard is the most implemented one compared to 
other versions of HL7 messaging standards. Due to the flexibility and optional 
fields in HL7 V2, the adoption rate for v2 is high. Due to the complexity and 
training requirements of HL7 V3, it is not accepted well by the healthcare 
community. But HL7 FHIR has all the best features of both HL7 v2 and V3. FHIR 
have an option of XML or JSON structures. It is human readable XHTML display. 
With the existing interoperability issues in NSW Health organisation, it is 
recommended to use FHIR as it resolves the ongoing interoperability challenges. 
Since FHIR is latest and implementation focused, the cost to implement these 
changes is minimal. 
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Though the status of the FHIR is in draft standard, its technological advantage 
and implementation focused approach is more promising and addressing the 
current needs. FHIR can use cost-effective extensions such as SMART FHIR 
APIs, an open source solution, using which a relevant function can be extracted 
and used in the popular health messaging standards. However, FHIR is in draft 
standard and also there is a cost involved for the healthcare community to retrain 
and retooling activities. Moreover, the health organisations have practical 
limitations such as their budget constraint to adopt a new health standard and 
training the health professionals who will be involved to use these health 
standards. So instead of using FHIR directly at this stage, the useful and modern 
features such as RESTful APIs, SMART FHIR and other relevant functions can 
be extracted and used with the existing health messaging standards such as 
v2.xx. Once the FHIR standard becomes stable, then these features can be used 
in FHIR easily. In this way, the health professionals also can meet the training 
requirements by managing gradual changes and get an opportunity to work with 
the latest features. Later this will be helpful to negotiate for further FHIR or any 
other advanced messaging standard implementations. 
 
 
This study has minor limitations. The limited time did not allow to test the 
implementations for the full level that would facilitate the ease of implantation 
using a number of programmers. Further, a thorough testing was not able to be 
completed in such a manner so that system is ethically hacked to understand the 
limitations of the messaging standards. 
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